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I. INTRODUCTION
The principal function of courts in environmental matters is to
restrain projects that have not been adequately planned and to
insist that they not go forward unless and until those who wish
to promote them can demonstrate that they have considered and
adequately resolved, reasonable doubts about their consequences.
Joseph L. Sax'
On June 7, 1971, the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act"
was signed into law by Governor Wendell Anderson, culminat-
ing over nine months of meetings, drafting and lobbying by its
proponents. The primary purpose of the Act is "to provide an
adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other na-
tural resources located within the state from pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction."3
Previously, Minnesota citizens were unable to effectively
protect the environment through judicial action. A private
nuisance action, the only such action available, could be main-
tained "by any person whose property is injuriously affected
or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance.14
However, if the conduct at issue injured or endangered the
rights "of any considerable number of members of the public,"3
then, before recovery could be had by a private individual, it
had to be shown that he "suffered an injury special or peculiar
to himself which is not common to the general public." The
1. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENvrmoNmENT, 113 (1970). See also
Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the
Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070 (1970).
2. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 952, coded therein as §§ 116B.01-.14
[hereinafter cited as MIN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.14 (1971)]. The full text
of the Act is set forth in the Appendix to this note.
3. Mu-. STAT. § 116B.01 (1971). The Rights Act contains no
mention of protection of the "public trust," a concept which is part of
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. MicH. CoMp. LAws ANx.
§ 691.1202(1) (1971). However, the language used in Section 116B.01
of the Rights Act, as well as in other sections, probably captures all that
is embodied in the concept of the public trust doctrine. The leading
article on the trust doctrine is Sax, The Public Trust in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mica L. Rrv. 478 (1970).
4. MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1969). See generally Porter, The Role
of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARM. L.
Rsv. 107 (1968); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA.
L. REv. 997 (1966).
5. MxNN. STAT. § 609.74(1) (1969).
6. Hill v. Stokely-VanCamp Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 321, 109 N.W.2d
749, 753 (1961); accord, Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:575
Environmental Rights Act (hereinafter referred to as "the
Rights Act" or "the Act") extends the ability of private indi-
viduals and groups to maintain an action to protect the en-
vironment by giving standing to:
[a]ny person residing within the state; the attorney general;
any political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or
agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any
partnership, corporation, association, organization, or other en-
tity having shareholders, members, partners or employees re-
siding within the state. .... 7
The Act authorizes four types of actions through which the
environment can be protected: (1) actions to enforce existing
environmental quality standards s (2) actions to enjoin conduct
which materially adversely affects the environment, 9 (3) actions
involving intervention into administrative proceedings or judi-
cial review thereof where the conduct at issue is alleged to have
caused pollution,'0 and (4) actions challenging the adequacy of
state environmental quality standards or regulations."' In each
case, the plaintiff must initially make out a prima facie showing
that his contention has merit. Then, in most cases, the court
must remit to the appropriate agency, if any, while still retain-
ing jurisdiction over the case. If the court finally concludes
that the plaintiff has discharged his burden of proof and that
the defendant has not satisfactorily established a defense under
the Act, it has several options. It may grant
N.W.2d 1 (1947); Lead v. Inch, 116 Minn. 467, 134 N.W. 218 (1912);
Viebahn v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs, 96 Minn. 276, 104 N.W. 1089 (1905).
See also Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74
HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961).
7. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1971). With one minor exception,
Sections 116B.09(1) and 116B.10(1) also contain this standing provi-
sion. The only difference is that, while Section 116B.03 (1) begins with
"any person," those two sections begin with "any natural person."
This difference is completely irrelevant, however, because the defini-
tion of "person" contained in Section 116B.02(2) includes "any natural
person."
The issue of standing to sue in environmental cases, an issue
which the Rights Act appears to solve, has been the topic of numerous
articles. See Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 123 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970); Porter,
supra note 4; Prosser, supra note 4; Rogers, The Need for Meaningful
Control in the Management of Federally Owned Timberlands, 4 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 121 (1969); Note, Standing on the Side of the Environ-
ment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 561 (1971); Comment, Environmental Law-Standing to Sue, 6
LAND & WATER L. REv. 527 (1971).
8. See MNN. STAT. §§ 116B.02(5), 116B.03(1) (1971).
9. Id.
10. Id. at § 116B.09(1).
11. Id. at § 116B.10(l).
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT
declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable relief,
or may impose such conditions upon a party as are necessary or
appropriate to protect the air, water, land or other natural re-
sources located within the state from pollution, impairment,
or destruction.' 2
Before further examining the operative provisions of the Rights
Act, this note will recount its legislative history.
1I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The original bill in Minnesota authorizing citizen suits to
protect the environment was introduced in the 1969 legislative
session by Governor Wendell Anderson,1 3 then a state senator.
It was very similar to the Model Act drafted by Professor
Joseph L. Sax.14 It is difficult to assess the impact of the An-
derson bill on events during the 1971 legislative session leading
up to the passage of the Environmental Rights Act. The bill
was introduced too late in the 1969 legislative session to be
considered. In fact, very few legislators were informed about
the concept of such legislation at that time. In addition, al-
though the Governor made pollution and environmental pro-
tection part of his 1970 gubernatorial campaign, he did not
actively support the citizen's suit bills during the 1971 legislative
session.
The Act as passed had its real beginning in an Environ-
mental Law Committee of the Minnesota Bar Association. In
October 1970, a subcommittee 15 was formed to draft a bill along
the lines of Sax's Model Act and a similar act which had been
recently passed in Michigan.'6
12. Id. at § 116B.07.
13. The Anderson bill was drafted by Grant Merritt, currently the
Executive Director of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.
14. Professor Sax is a professor of law at the University of Michi-
gan. The Model Act he drafted is entitled the Natural Resource Con-
servation and Environmental Protection Act of 1969. It was drafted
at the request of the West Michigan Environmental Action Council
The complete text of this Act can be found in the appendix to J.
SAX, supra note 1, at 247-52.
15. The chairman of the subcommittee, Richard N. Flint, was an ac-
tive member of the Sierra Club in Minnesota. Other key members in-
cluded John M. Broeker, chairman of the North Star Chapter of the Sierra
Club, Charles K Dayton, a member of the Sierra Club and currently the
Director of the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG),
and Will H. Hartfeldt, also a Sierra Club member and a former
Deputy Attorney General for the Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources.
16. McE. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-1207 (1971). Known as
the Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection
Act of 1970, the Act was signed on July 27, 1970. For a discussion of
1972]
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The subcommittee members agreed that there were four
major controversies during the course of over a dozen drafting
meetings.17 The first was whether both equitable relief and
compensatory damages would be available to successful plain-
tiffs. It was concluded that the Act would not provide damages
as a form of relief. The consensus was that it would have
made the bill appear too strong to have a realistic chance of
being passed. There were also fears that, if damages were
available, the courts would be less likely to "protect"' 8 the
environment by eliminating pollution and more likely to order
monetary compensation for environmental damage. 1 It was
also thought that if damages were available opponents of the
legislation would attack it as another vehicle for attorneys to
obtain legal fees.20
The other areas of major disagreement involved legal fees
and defenses. Some members of the subcommittee wanted the
prevailing plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees and court costs.
This was eventually rejected for two reasons. First, it was
thought this would open the door to such awards for defendants
if the plaintiff did not prevail.2 1  This would have been a
significant deterrent to many plaintiffs in all but the most
clear-cut cases. Moreover, it would have left the legislation
open to attack as a vehicle to produce legal fees even more than
the inclusion of a damages provision.
the legislative history of that Act, see 4 J.L. REFORM 358 (1970). Simi-
lar acts have since been passed in other states, including: Conn.
Laws 1971, Pub. Act No. 96; Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-343; Ind. Laws 1971,
ch. 35; Mass. Laws 1971, ch. 732. A similar bill was introduced in
Congress in 1970 by Senators Hart and McGovern. It was known as
the Environmental Protection Act of 1970, S. 3575, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). It was reintroduced by the same senators in 1971 as S. 1032,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The companion bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1970 by Congressman Udall as H.R. 18429,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and again in 1971 as H.R. 5074, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1971). This proposed legislation is discussed in Note, Stand-
ing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen
Participation, 1 EcOLOGY L.Q. 561, 609-49 (1971).
17. Interview with Richard N. Flint, chairman of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Minnea-
polis, Minnesota, Aug. 30, 1971.
18. MIN . STAT. § 116B.01 (1971).
19. See note 171 infra.
20. Interview with Charles K. Dayton, member of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 2, 1971.
21. Interview with John M. Broeker, member of the Environmen-
tal Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, Sept. 7, 1971.
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There were two points of sharp disagreement over what
should constitute a defense under the Act. The first was wheth-
er the defense of "no feasible and prudent alternative" should
be included as part of an affirmative defense.2 2 Such language
is contained in both Sax's Model Act23 and the Michigan Act,2 4
but some members of the Subcommittee felt this would allow
economic considerations to become a defense. The second point
was closely connected to the first. It was thought by some
that economic considerations should never be considered, while
others felt they should always be a factor. The final draft in-
cluded the "no feasible and prudent alternative" provision."
However, in the same section, a sentence was added stating that
"[e]conomic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense
hereunder."28
The final draft was submitted to the Bar Association Board
of Governors in January 1971. After considerable debate and
private discussion, the Board of Governors decided not to en-
dorse the bill. In the meantime, the Subcommittee which had
drafted the bill decided to find authors in the legislature and
to work for the passage of the bill, regardless of what the
Board of Governors decided.
During December 1970 and January 1971 another factor
came into play. The Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens
Association (MECCA), which had been in close contact with
the drafting committee, decided that the Lawyers' bill, the new
name for the Bar bill, was too weak. Using the Model Act and
the Lawyers' bill as a foundation, MECCA drafted its own bill.
There were several provisions in it which made it considerably
more stringent than the Lawyers' bill. It generally made non-
pollution the goal, eliminated the "no feasible and prudent
alternative" provision and specified that economics could only
be considered in fashioning a remedy. The MECCA bill made
provision for per diem damages and also would have allowed
22. This language is in the Rights Act Mnu .STAT. §§ 116B.04,
116B.09 (2) (1971).
23. Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection
Act of 1969 §§ 3 and 6 (a). See note 14 supra.
24. Mca. Coivo. LAws ANw. §§ 691.1203(1) and 691.1205(2)
(1971).
25. Draft of Dec. 28, 1970 §§ 4 and 9 (2), on file with the ]inne-
sota Law Review.
26. Id. at § 4. The language which was added to § 9(2) was
somewhat different: "Economic considerations alone shall not justify
such conduct, program or product." This was amended to finally read
"Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct."
1972]
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the courts to specify new and stricter standards of environmen-
tal quality in certain situations.2 7
During January 1971, both groups found authors for their
bills. The Lawyers' Committee decided on Reps. Rolf T. Nelson,
John P. Wingard, Fred C. Norton, Jon 0. Haaven and Howard R.
Albertson in the House and Sens. W.G. Kirchner, Wayne G.
Popham and Edward J. Gearty in the Senate. Their bill, desig-
nated House File (H.F.) 284 and Senate File (S.F.) 418, was
introduced in the House on January 25, 1971 and soon after in
the Senate. MECCA's bill, H.F. 715 and S.F. 471, was intro-
duced in the House on February 8, 1971, and in the Senate
two days later. The primary authors of the MECCA bill were
Rep. Paul R. Petrafeso and Senator George R. Conzemius. The
importance of the selection of primary authors became evident
immediately in the House. Rep. Nelson, a respected member of
the Conservative majority, was able to send H.F. 284 to the Ju-
diciary Committee, chaired by Rep. Albertson, another author
of H.F. 284. He in turn sent it to a special subcommittee
chaired by Rep. Keefe, who was favorably disposed to this
type of legislation. On the other hand, Rep. Petrafeso, a mem-
ber of the Liberal minority, was unable to prevent H.F. 715
from being sent to Rep. Gustafson's Environmental Preserva-
tion Committee. Since Rep. Gustafson was one of the most
severe critics of the concept of citizens' suits, H.F. 715 was
essentially dead. However, the fact that the MECCA bill ex-
isted was of some benefit. The stringency of H.F. 715 made
the Lawyers' bill appear very mild. Representative Nelson was
able to use this to advantage. In a newspaper article he de-
scribed his bill as being a middle course between the MECCA
approach and the position of the Minnesota Association of Com-
merce and Industry (MACI), a major opponent of the bill.28
Although the Senate took no action on the bills until late
March, the House subcommittee to which H.F. 284 had been
sent began hearings in early February. Representative Keefe's
subcommittee held seven meetings during February and March.
From the start of these hearings, the proponents of H.F. 284
were well organized. They were careful to have supporters at
the hearings and always were prepared for questions on the
27. Differences between the MECCA bill and the Lawyers' bill
were set out in a critique which was distributed by MECCA (private
files of Howard Vogel, a legislative representative of MECCA, in Min-
neapolis, Minnesota).
28. Minneapolis Tribune, Mar. 14, 1971, § C, cols. 1 & 2, at 2.
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operation of the bill. Various members of the bar committee
which originally drafted the bill testified at these hearings,
and most were Sierra Club members. Representatives of other
groups also testified in favor of the general concept and H.F. 284
in particular. 29 These groups included the League of Women
Voters,30 the Izaak Walton League and the Citizens League.
Although opponents were slower to organize, they became
increasingly active as the hearings progressed. Critics of the
bill who testified at these hearings included representatives of
the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry,31 the
Minnesota Timber Producers Association and the League of
Minnesota Municipalities, as well as a number of individuals
who worked for various industrial concerns but stated they
were only expressing their personal views.
During these subcommittee hearings in the House, a num-
ber of important amendments were made to the bill. At the
Feb. 25 meeting, Rep. Nelson introduced several amendments,
all of which were adopted. The name of the bill was changed
from the Minnesota Environmental Protection Act to the Min-
nesota Environmental Rights Act.32  Another amendment pro-
tected persons from liability for conduct taken on their own
29. Mr. John Badalich, then the Executive Director of the Min-
nesota Pollution Control Agency, testified in favor of the concept al-
though he added the ambiguous statement that the bill should conform
to and recognize his agency's procedures. A copy of Mr. Badalich's
testimony and recommendations is contained in Official House Judiciary
Subcommittee Report, H.F. 284.
Mr. Howard Vogel, representing MECCA, testified frequently.
He was decidedly in favor of the concept embodied in H.F. 284 but
was of the opinion that H.F. 715 was superior because it promised
greater environmental protection. Interview with Howard J. Vogel,
member of MECCA, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 9, 1971.
30. The League of Women Voters was represented by Mrs. Rodney
Loper. Her testimony is contained in a letter distributed to all com-
mittee members and is contained in the Official House Judiciary Sub-
committee Report, H.F. 284.
31. That association, popularly known as MACI, prepared and
distributed copies of its testimony and recommendations. Among
other provisions in the bill, MACI was specifically critical of (1) allow-
ing courts to set standards on a case-by-case basis because it would
prevent long range planning, (2) not providing specific guidelines to
determine what constitutes pollution, and (3) shifting the burden of
proof from the plaintiff to the defendant upon a prima facie showing by
the plaintiff. This critique is included in the Official House Judiciary
Subcommittee Report, LF. 284, Appendix 4
32. This latter name was the original name of MECCA's bill and
was adopted by mutual agreement between MECCA and the Lawyers'
Committee.
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land as long as other air, water, or land was not harmed.
The term "quietude" 34 was added to the list which defines
natural resources. In addition, a provision was added to what
is now Section 116B.09, the Section dealing with intervention
into administrative proceedings, which provided that "[elco-
nomic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct, pro-
gram, or product."
During the next few meetings, both MECCA and the Pollu-
tion Control Agency (PCA) introduced a number of amend-
ments. The MECCA amendments included adding damages as
a remedy, specifically defining pollution and eliminating the
defense of "no feasible and prudent alternative."3 5 All of these
amendments were defeated. The PCA amendment included a
definition of pollution, a provision on scope of review where
the PCA is involved, a venue provision and a shift in the bur-
den of proof to the defendant where the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing that the defendant is violating or is likely
to violate a PCA standard or rule. All of these passed. One
major amendment failed to pass. The PCA introduced a version
of what is now Section 116B.10, which allows challenges to
agency standards. However, at the same meeting another ver-
sion of it was adopted. The most critical difference between
the two versions was that the PCA amendment incorporated
the Administrative Procedure Act while the one which was
finally adopted did not do so. 3 6
At the last hearing, several amendments were introduced
which had been drafted by MACI. One would have defined
pollution only in terms of a violation of an agency rule. An-
other would have required notice within 60 days to "appropriate
government units" before commencing a suit. The other amend-
ment of major significance would have eliminated any shift
in the burden of proof. All of these were defeated.3 7 Repre-
sentative Nelson stated that proponents of the bill were success-
ful because they were able to demonstrate that these amend-
33. MMN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1971).
34. Id. at § 116B.02(4). This took on added importance when,
late in the 1971 legislative session, a bill on noise control was passed.
Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 727, amending MUNN. STAT. § 116.06 (1971).
35. A copy of these amendments, as introduced, is contained in
the Official House Judiciary Subcommittee Report, H.F. 284, Exhibits
B, C and D.
36. Id. at Exhibit F.
37. Id. at Exhibits J and J-1.
[Vol. 56:575
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ments would have restricted the operation of ELF. 284 in a
manner disproportionate to any problems they could solve.38
The amendments proposed by MACI were characteristic of
the tactical position taken by special interest groups which
lobbied against H.F. 284. The amendments were designed to
effectively limit the operation of the bill but not kill it entirely.
Pollution and environmental protection were important public
issues during 1971 and very few groups or individuals wanted
to appear totally opposed to the bill.
The last subcommittee meeting was on March 22. After
passing out of the subcommittee, the bill went before the full
House Judiciary Committee. With Rep. Albertson as chairman
and with Rep. Nelson doing much of the groundwork, the bill
passed by a -20 to 7 vote. It was then sent to the Government
Operations Committee, chaired by Rep. Newcomb. The bill was
bottled up in this committee until May.
In the Senate, both the MECCA bill and the Lawyers' bill
had been sent to Sen. Ukelburg's Natural Resources and Envi-
ronment Committee. No hearings were held on the bills during
February or March, and it was apparent that the legislation
would die there if left in that committee. The Senate majority
caucus was aware of the situation and, due to a combination of
lobbying, newspaper coverage and letter writing, they decided
to take the bill out of Sen. Ukelburg's committee. It was
sent to Sen. Popham's Civil Administration Committee. Senator
Popham was an author of the Lawyers' bill (S.F. 418) and, in
general, had been a supporter of environmental legislation. An
initial hearing was set for April 1, in the State Department
Subcommittee.
At the first hearing, it was moved that the subcommittee
adopt the version of H.F. 284 which had been passed by the
House Judiciary Committee. However, no vote was taken at
this meeting, and instead, most of the time was taken by at-
tacks on S.F. 418 by MACI and Sen. Dosland, an influential
Conservative and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
MACI proposed the same set of amendments as were voted
down in the House by the subcommittee, still trying to water
the bill down as much as possible. Sen. Dosland's criticism
was somewhat different. He felt the bill should be limited to
upgrading state agency powers, an approach consistent with his
38. Interview with Rep. Roll Nelson, member of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Aug. 23, 1971.
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past activity in environmental legislation. He had been a strong
supporter of PCA legislation 30 and earlier in the legislative
session had introduced a bill which would have given the PCA
considerably more power.40
At the conclusion of this meeting, proponents of S.F. 418
concluded that they would have to make some compromises.'"
Consequently, the Lawyers' Committee met with MACI, several
legislators, and various other interested groups during the first
two weeks in April. After considerable discussion, what was
thought to be a workable compromise was reached. Proponents
agreed not to contest amendments which would make compli-
ance with PCA, Department of Natural Resources, Department
of Health and Department of Agriculture rules a complete de-
fense for a defendant. In exchange, it was agreed that where
any two of these agencies had conflicting standards the most
stringent would control. It was also agreed that the bill
would contain the same section on challenging agency standards
as was included in H.F. 284.
The next fruitful Senate subcommittee meeting was on
April 29. Time was of the essence at this point because bills
which have not cleared committee by April 30 have to be re-
ferred to the Rules Committee. The situation was further com-
plicated by what proponents of the bill felt was a surprise
move by Sen. Dosland.4"2 He proposed that Sections 3 through
8 be deleted from the bill, cutting out actions to enforce en-
vironmental quality standards and actions to enjoin conduct
which materially adversely affects the environment, but leaving
intact those provisions involving administrative proceedings and
review thereof and challenges to environmental quality stand-
ards. This amendment passed, and the subcommittee then
promptly passed S.F. 418, such as remained of it. While Sen.
Dosland's amendment was a disaster from one point of view,
39. Interview with Robert V. Johnson, assistant attorney for the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept.
2, 1971.
40. S.F. 572. This bill was designed to give the PCA additional
enforcement power by providing procedures for civil penalties pre-
viously unavailable. It was passed by the Senate but was killed in the
House in Rep. Gustafson's Environmental Preservation Committee.
41. Interview with John M. Broeker, member of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 7, 1971.
42. Interview with Richard N. Flint, chairman of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 9, 1971.
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it was beneficial from another; it allowed the bill to get out of
the subcommittee on that same day.4 3
A meeting of the full Civil Administration Committee was
called for the following evening. The full committee was more
receptive to the bill than the subcommittee had been. They
voted to restore Sections 3 through 8. However, a number of
restrictive amendments were also adopted. Natural persons
were excluded from either suing or being sued under the bill.
The definition of pollution was narrowed by striking language
which made prospective harm to the environment actionable. A
provision was added to Section 3 (1) which underscored the
defense of compliance with PCA, Department of Natural Re-
sources, Department of Health and Department of Agriculture
rules and regulations which was already set out in Section 4.
A final amendment was passed which made the bill expire on
July 1, 1975. The bill was then passed and sent to the Senate
floor. Although proponents of the bill were to later fight all
of these amendments, it was felt that to do so in the Civil
Administration Committee would have permanently stalled the
bill.44
In the House, the bill had not been considered since its
referral to Rep. Newcomb's Government Operations Committee.
With the April 30 deadline in mind, proponents initiated a
letter-writing campaign. The Conservative caucus in the House
began to feel it was unwise to let Rep. Newcomb kill the bill.
After Rep. Nelson agreed to the inclusion of the amendments
previously worked out with MACI, including one which elim-
inated shifting the burden of proof on the issue of pollution,
the caucus made certain that the bill was given a hearing.
After 10 minutes of discussion, the Government Operations
Committee passed the bill on May 4, but not before another
amendment was added excluding violations of odor pollution
43. Sen. Dosland probably could have prevented the bill from
leaving the subcommittee in any form. His actions at the April 29
meeting may be explained by events which took place a week earlier.
John Broeker, chairman of the North Star Chapter of the Sierra Club,
made a speech in Moorhead, Minnesota, which is Sen. Dosland's home
town. He charged Sen. Dosland with opposing and seriously threat-
ening the bill. The speech was reported in the Fargo-Moorhead Forum
on April 22, 1971. In the same article, Sen. Dosland replied by stating
that he supported some of the concepts in the bill but that it required
further amendment before he could completely endorse it.
44. Interview with Will L Hartfeldt, member of the Environmental
Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in St. Paul,
Minnesota, Sept. 13, 1971.
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standards and rules from the jurisdiction of the bill.45 Because
the April 30 deadline had passed, the bill had to be sent to the
Rules Committee which passed it and promptly sent it to the
floor of the House.
Because the House version of the bill was stronger, pro-
ponents wanted the House to vote on H.F. 284 before the Senate
acted on S.F. 418. However, Sen. Kirchner was unable to put
off the vote in the Senate, and it took place on May 13. Because
the Lawyers' Committee had been confident the vote could be
put off, they were not in attendance that day. Senator Dosland
proposed what he called housekeeping amendments. One re-
stricted the definition of pollution to what amounted to a vio-
lation of agency standards and, because of the way the
amendment was worded, few legislators realized the effect it
would have. He also proposed that farmers and farm corpo-
rations be exempted from the definition of who could be sued.
Both of these amendments passed. Senators Wolfe and Davies
proposed amendments which, on the surface, appeared to re-
strict the bill even more than Sen. Dosland's amendments and
these were narrowly defeated. The bill was then passed by a
64 to 0 vote. Although the Lawyers' Committee was relieved
the bill had at least passed the Senate, they were firmly against
accepting the definition of pollution which had been inserted.
They wanted a definition which provided for actions to enjoin
conduct which materially adversely affects the environment,
not merely for enforcement of agency rules and regulations.40
As the final week of the regular legislative session began,
the House had not voted on the bill, now the House version of
S.F. 418. Due mostly to the efforts of Rep. Nelson, the bill
was put on the consent calendar on May 20, three days before
the end of the regular session. The proponents agreed to in-
clude provisions which protected farmers from being sued, but
were able to draft it themselves. Despite this, most rural
legislators voted against the bill, and it passed by a 98 to 33
margin.
45. The PCA had issued a revision of its rules on odors which
eliminated a provision exempting farm and other natural odors. This
was a mistake and a correction letter was later mailed out. However,
this action brought considerable pressure on the bill from rural legisla-
tors.
46. Interview with Will H. Hartfeldt, member of the Environmental
Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in St. Paul, Min-
nesota, Sept. 13, 1971.
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The Lawyers' Committee wanted the Senate to vote on the
House version of S.F. 418. However, Sen. Kirchner moved that
a conference committee be formed instead of moving for a
vote.47 After considerable discussion, the Conference Committee
reached the following compromise: the House (1) agreed to
accept Sen. Dosland's farm exceptions, (2) conceded the proviso
contained in the Senate version underscoring the Section 4 de-
fense of compliance with regulations of the four specified agen-
cies and departments, and (3) the House accepted Sen. Dosland's
provision which specified that the court can grant costs to a
defendant for injury caused by a temporary injunction where
the defendant prevails at trial.48 However, the House was able
to prevail on the more crucial points. A provision was added
to the definition of pollution which provided for actions to en-
join conduct which materially adversely affects the environ-
ment. The language making conduct which "is likely to" harm
the environment actionable was also put back into the bill,40
and the 1975 expiration date was eliminated. The bill, desig-
nated as S.F. 418, was then sent back and passed by both the
House and Senate.
A combination of factors coalesced to bring about the pass-
age of S.F. 418. The political climate was ripe in 1971 for this
type of legislation, and there was never an organized opposition
to the bill within the legislature. The Governor was a Liberal
and had introduced similar legislation in the previous legislative
session when he was a state senator. The Conservatives, in
general, saw the bill as an opportunity to take the lead in the
ecology field in the state. The Lawyers' Committee organized
early and its members were willing to spend a considerable
amount of time working to pass the bill. They also were careful
in selecting authors. The selection of Rep. Nelson was probably
the best choice they could have made for a primary author in
the House. The opposition was formidable but was somewhat
restrained by public opinion; no one seemed willing to be given
credit for killing the bill outright. Extensive newspaper cover-
age and the letter writing campaign organized by the Lawyers'
Committee had a great deal to do with this.
47. The members of this committee were Reps. Nelson, Newcomb
and Savelkoul and Sens. Bergerud, Dosland and Kirchner.
48. Minn. Rules Civ. P., Rule 65.03 already provided this.
49. These two conference committee changes were the most cru-
cial ones. Without them, plaintiffs under the Rights Act would have
had no way to sue alleged polluters unless they were currently in vio-
lation of an environmental quality standard.
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III. THE OPERATION OF THE RIGHTS ACT 50
A. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act states that "each
person is entitled by right to the protection, preservation, and
enhancement of air, water, land and other natural resources
located within the state .... -51 In order to give effect to
these rights, the Act declares "it is in the public interest to
provide an adequate civil remedy to protect" these resources. 2
It authorizes four types of actions by which an "adequate civil
remedy" may be obtained: (1) actions to enjoin conduct which
materially adversely affects the environment; 53 (2) actions to
enforce existing environmental quality standards and regula-
tions; 54 (3) actions involving intervention into administrative
proceedings or judicial review thereof which concern environ-
mental matters;55 and (4) actions against state agencies chal-
lenging the adequacy of environmental quality standards and
permits issued by them.5 6
In parts B, C and D of this section, these four methods
will be analyzed within the context of several hypothetical fact
situations. This approach was selected for two reasons. First,
it makes the analysis of the Act less abstract than it might
otherwise be. Second, the Act is really a series of rather closed
systems for protecting the environment through judicial action.
This can best be illustrated through the use of hypothetical
situations. However, the emphasis will be on the Act itself,
not on the resolution of each issue raised by the hypotheticals.
Part B contains a situation involving the discharge of sew-
age into a lake and the use of the Rights Act to enjoin such
pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment. Part
C centers on crop spraying which is possibly in violation of an
environmental quality regulation and the use of the Rights
Act to enforce that regulation. Part D involves the promulga-
tion by an agency of an environmental quality standard. It
50. The Rights Act will be herein interpreted and analyzed.
However, because the Act is lengthy, complex and, in several places,
ambiguous, it should be read completely before proceeding further.
The text of the Act is set forth in the Appendix.
51. M.Nn. STAT. § l16B.01 (1971).
52. Id.
53. See id. at §§ 116B.02(5), 116B.03 (1).
54. Id.
55. Id. at § 116B.09 (1).
56. Id. at § 116B.10(l).
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illustrates how intervention into administrative hearings on con-
duct potentially harmful to the environment and the resulting
judicial review of those proceedings can be effected. It also
discusses the use of the Act to challenge the promulgation by a
state agency of an environmental quality standard which is
inadequate to protect the environment.
B. ACTION TO ENJOIN CONDUCT WHICH MATERIALLY
ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE ENVIRNONmNT
County X, located in Minnesota, recently enacted a shore-
land protection ordinance, pursuant to the Regulation of Shore-
land Development Act.57 This ordinance is basically the same
as the Model Shoreland Protection Ordinance drafted by the
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR).ss In com-
pliance with the county ordinance, Corporation Y, a "family
farm corporation,"59 applied for and received a permit to con-
struct a large number of multi-family rentals units on the
lakeshore of a Recreational Development Lake 0 in an unin-
57. !MN. STAT. § 105.485 (1971). The overall purpose of the
Shoreland Act is to protect the shorelands of lakes and streams in unin-
corporated areas of each county through the adoption by all counties
of a shoreland protection ordinance. In order to facilitate this, Sub-
division (3) directs the Commissioner of Natural Resources to develop
and promulgate model standards and criteria which include:
(a) The area of a lot and length of water frontage suitable for
a building site; (b) the placement of structures in relation to
shorelines and roads; (c) the placement and construction of
sanitary and waste disposal facilities; (d) designation of types
of land uses; (e) changes in bottom contours of adjacent public
waters; (f) preservation of natural shorelands through the
restriction of land uses; (g) variances from the minimum
standards and criteria; and (h) a model ordinance.
Subdivision (4) specifies that each county must adopt its own
shoreland protection ordinance by July 1, 1972, and that it must meet
the minimum standards set by the Commissioner. In the event this
does not occur, the Commissioner is directed to adopt such an ordi-
nance for the county and to charge any costs of doing so to it.
58. MN. CoNsERvAToN REGs. 70-84 [hereinafter cited as CONS.
REGs.] This publication contains the minimum standards and criteria
as well as the model ordinance which the Commissioner of Natural Re-
sources is directed to promulgate by MIN. STAT. § 105.485 (3) (1971).
59. See note 66 infra.
60. CoNs. REs. 71 (a) (2) (bb). The management goals and ob-
jectives set forth for this type of lake are:
to provide management policies reasonably consistent with
existing development and use; to provide for the beneficial use
of public waters by the general public, as well as the riparian
owners; to provide a balance between the lake resource and
lake use; to provide for a multiplicity of lake uses; and to pro-
tect areas unsuitable for residential and commercial uses from
development.
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corporated area of the county. It also complied with the loca-
tion standards for septic tank soil absorption systems in the
county ordinance6 ' and received a permit for the installation of
this sewage disposal system. 2
Several months after the rental units were completed and
put into operation, some lakeshore property owners filed suit
against Corporation Y under the authority of Section 116B.03
(1) of the Rights Act, which provides that an action can be
maintained by
[a]ny person residing within the state . . . for declaratory or
equitable relief in the name of the state of Minnesota against
any person, for the protection of ... natural resources located
within the state, whether publicly or privately owned, from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.
The complaint alleges that the defendant's disposal systems are
discharging various nutrients into underground streams which
feed into the lake and that these nutrients promote the growth
of undesirable plant life, thereby impairing the aesthetic value
of the lake,63 and contribute to the general reduction of the
lake's water quality. It is further alleged that this constitutes
"pollution, impairment or destruction" 64 of the lake, which is
defined, in part, as "any conduct which materially adversely
affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environ-
ment."65 Plaintiffs have requested a permanent injunction pro-
61. CONS. REGS. 77 (3.36). This part of the Model Ordinance spe-
cifies that
[p]lacement of soil absorption systems shall be in accordance
with the public waters classification of the applicable public
water body and shall be subject to the following specifications
where soil conditions are adequate; ... (2) On Recreational
Development Lakes, at least 75 feet from the normal high
water mark.
62. CONS. RErs. 77 (7.52).
63. MiNN. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1971). This provision, which de-
fines natural resources, states that "[s]cenic and esthetic resources shall
also be considered natural resources when owned by any governmental
unit or agency."
64. Id. at § 116B.02(5).
65. Pollution is defined as a violation of "any environmental
quality standard, limitation .. . or permit . . . ." Id.
The entire definition is qualified by the proviso that it shall
not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate, any
such standard, limitation . . . or permit solely because of the
introduction of an odor into the air.
Id.
This provision was added as an amendment late in the 1971 legis-
lative session and was a response to a revision of an order issued by the
PCA. The effect of this new order was to no longer exempt farm
odors from prosecution. This was a mistake and was later rescinded,
but not before rural legislators had reacted. Interestingly, the provi-
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hibiting the operation of the rental units until a different and
more effective sewage disposal system can be installed.
1. Motions to Dismiss
One ground upon which Corporation Y might attempt to
obtain a dismissal is that, while Section 116B.03(1) does au-
thorize an action to be maintained against "any person," it is
a "family farm corporation" 6 and is not a "person," which is
defined as
any natural person, any state, municipality or other govern-
mental or political subdivision.., and any other entity, except
a family farm, a family farm corporation or a bonafide farmer
corporation. 67
Based on this definition, a court could conclude that the farm
related exceptions are clear, unambiguous and not open to judi-
cial construction.6 It could hold that any entity falling within
these exclusions cannot be sued under any circumstances by
virtue of any authority in the Rights Act.
However, such a construction of the Rights Act would
seem inappropriate for several reasons. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court has stated that the "ultimate goal" in interpreting
a statute is "to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature."69  Since the amendment which established these
sion really gives little protection to farmers or anyone else whose
conduct causes odors to be introduced into the air. Action under the
Rights Act is prohibited only if based solely on the violation of some
standard or permit. If the odor violation is alleged together with other
charges or if there is no applicable standard or permit, the introduc-
tion of odors into the air is actionable under the Act.
66. Id. at § 116B.02 (7). This is defined as a corporation
[f]ounded for the purposes of farming and ownin a Icultural
land, in which the majority of the voting stock isgheld by, and
the majority of the stockholders are, members of a famil re-
lated to each other within the third degree of kindred ac-
cording to the rules of the civil law, and at least one of whose
stockholders is a person residing on or actively operating the
farm, and none of whose stockholders are corporations.
This definition does not preclude such a corporation from operating
a number of rental units in addition to farming. For purposes of
illustration, it will be assumed that Corporation Y is a "family farm
corporation."
67. Id. at § 116B.02 (2).
68. Lahr v. City of St. Cloud, 246 Minn. 489, 494 n.10, 76 N.W.2d 119,
122 n.9 (1956); M~inneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. City of St. Paul,
240 Minn. 434, 437, 61 N.W.2d 533, 535-36 (1953). Mnnw. STAT. § 645.16
(1967) states, in part, that "[w]hen the words of a law in their appli-
cation to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
the spirit."
69. Lenz v. Coon Creek Watershed Dist., 278 Minn. 1, 9, 153 N.W.2d
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exceptions was mainly supported by rural legislators who feared
their farming constituents might be harassed by the bill as it
then existed,7 0 the exceptions should be read as relating only
to farming activities. It is very unlikely that the legislature
which enacted this environmental protection statute had any
intention to exempt a party from being sued under the Act for
nonfarm activities merely because the party also engaged in
farming. Moreover, the strict reading of the definition of "per-
son" which Corporation Y proposes would lead to two rather
absurd results. First, since "any person" is authorized to main-
tain an action under Sections 116B.03, 116B.09 and 116B.10 of
the Rights Act, anyone so engaged in farming would be ex-
cluded.71 And second, since the Act specifies "that each person
is entitled by right to protection" of natural resources in the
state,72 anyone engaging in farming would be without such
rights.
Corporation Y could also move for a dismissal on the ground
that the conduct at issue is pursuant to both a DNR environ-
mental quality standard and a permit. This argument would
be based on Section 116B.03 (1) which provides that:
[n]o action shall be allowable under this section for conduct
taken by a person pursuant to any environmental quality stand-
ard, limitation . . . or permit issued by the pollution control
agency, department of natural resources, department of health
or department of agriculture.
Essentially, the defendant's argument has three parts: (1) the
DNR's Model Shoreland Protection Ordinance is an "environ-
mental quality standard, [or] limitation;" (2) a county ordinance
which adopts the Model Shoreland Protection Ordinance should
be accorded the status of a DNR environmental quality stand-
ard; (3) Corporation Y is in complete compliance with the
209, 216 (1967); County of Hennepin v. City of Hopkins, 239 Minn. 357,
362, 58 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1953). Where the statute is not completely free
of all ambiguity, provision is made in MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1967) for
ascertaining the legislative intent. In doing so, one of the statutory pre-
sumptions is that the "legislature intends to favor the public interest
as against any private interest." MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (5) (1967).
70. Interview with Rep. Rolf Nelson, member of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Aug. 23, 1971.
71. There is a possibility that even if the farm-related exceptions
were literally construed, a natural person who owned a "family farm,"
"family farm corporation" or "bona fide farmer corporation" could have
standing under the Rights Act. The farm related exceptions are all
artificial entities; although the entity itself may not have standing,
those natural persons owning such entities could still maintain an action
under the Act.
72. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1971).
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county ordinance. For purposes of illustration, it will be as-
sumed that Corporation Y is in compliance with the county
ordinance. It is suggested, however, that defendant's argu-
ments fail and the motion to dismiss should be denied.
The first proposition underlying the defendant's argument
can be challenged on the ground that an "environmental qual-
ity standard" must have the force of law and that the Model
Shoreland Protection Ordinance lacks such force. Since pollu-
tion is defined as a violation of an "environmental quality
standard,"7 3 if such standards are not restricted to those having
the force of law, the definition becomes immensely expansive.
For example, the Department of Health has published standards
relating to sanitation which were intended only to be recom-
mendations.7 4 Certainly these could literally be construed as
"environmental quality standards," but such a construction
would expose vast numbers of persons to suit under the Rights
Act for failure to comply with only recommended standards.
Also, in view of the fact that pollution is also defined as "con-
duct which materially adversely affects" the environment,75 no
further expansion of the definition seems warranted.
Whether or not the Model Shoreland Protection Ordinance
has the force of law with respect to actual pollution standards
is not altogether clear. It does contain suggested minimum
standards for the adoption of shoreland protection ordinances
by the counties in the state.76 Also, it seems likely that a
county ordinance which copies the Model Ordinance would be
approved by the DNR. 7 7 Moreover, since the DNR has the final
determination of the adequacy of the ordinance, it could be ar-
gued that an ordinance which is approved is incorporated by
reference. However, the purpose of the Regulation of Shore-
land Development Act was not to impose state regulations on
each county, but rather to ensure that counties adopted their
own ordinances to protect lakes and shorelines. The Model
Shoreland Protection Ordinance was drafted by the DNR only
73. Id. at § 116B.02 (5).
74. MnwESoTA INDIvIDuAL SEWAGE SYSTEM CODE, MnnUM
STANDARDS REComMEwDED BY THE MINESOTA DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH(1972). However, failure to follow these recommendations may well
result in violation of PCA regulations. Interview with Frederick F.
Heise], Director, Division of Environmental Health, Minnesota Dept. of
Health, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 18, 1971.
75. MNN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
76. See note 58 supra.
77. Interview with James W. Menter, drafter of the Model Shore-
land Protection Ordinance, in St. Paul, Minnesota, August 15, 1971.
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for illustrative purposes to aid the individual counties in drafting
their own ordinances. 78  In fact, the Model Ordinance states
that its adoption verbatim or by reference will not necessarily
constitute an adequate ordinance. 7  Only in the event that a
county failed to draft an ordinance or drafted a deficient one
would the DNR be authorized to draft one for that county.80
Even if it could be established that the Model Shoreland
Protection Ordinance was an "environmental quality standard,"
Corporation Y would still have to establish that the county
ordinance should be accorded the status of a DNR environmental
quality ordinance. The legislative history of the provision in
Section 116B.03 (1) upon which the motion to dismiss is based
indicates that the county ordinance should not be given such
status. The original version of that provision was proposed by
the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry8' and
would have made compliance with any environmental quality
standard a defense to an action where the conduct at issue is
alleged to be "materially adversely affecting" the environment.
The present provision is the result of a compromise 82 and has a
considerably narrower scope; only standards of the "pollution
control agency, department of natural resources, department of
health or department of agriculture"88 provide a statutory de-
fense if complied with. However, the reason behind the provision
does lend some support to the defendant's position. It was
designed to protect those business concerns which relied upon
and complied with environmental quality standards issued by
these agencies in order to facilitate long range planning. This
purpose is somewhat satisfied by the reliance upon and com-
pliance with the county ordinance by Corporation Y.
The fact remains, however, that the county enacted the
standards for the sewage system being utilized by the defendant
and issued the permit which Corporation Y needed. In addition,
it is the county which has the sole authority to enforce the
standards. The DNR's guidelines for adoption of county shore-
land protection ordinances specify that "it is the duty of the
78. MINN. STAT. § 105.485 (3) (1971).
79. CONs. REGS. 76.
80. MInII. STAT. § 105.485 (4) (1971).
81. Interview with Richard N. Flint, chairman of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Minnea-
polis, Minnesota, August 30, 1971.
82. See text following note 41 supra.
83. MnN. STAT. § 116B.03 (1) (1971). [This group of agencies Is
hereinafter cited as the "four specified agencies."]
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county to ... provide for the administration and enforcement
of the ordinance it adopts."8 4 And this is consistent with the
position taken by the DNR at a recent hearing,8s that minus
specific statutory authority, it has no direct power over local
land use.
2. Triad, Burden of Proof and Defenses
Assuming the motions to dismiss have been defeated, the
plaintiffs' next concerns would be the requirements regarding
the production of evidence and the anticipation of defenses
which might be raised at trial. These aspects of a trial are dealt
with in Section 116B.04 of the Rights Act, which contains two
paragraphs. The first deals exclusively with cases involving
an alleged violation of an environmental quality standard issued
by one of the four specified agencies. As discussed in the
previous material, such a regulation is probably not involved in
this case. When an environmental quality standard of one of
these agencies is not involved, the second paragraph of Section
116B.04 is the controlling provision.
There are two basic groups of cases which come under this
paragraph: (1) cases where it is alleged that the defendant's
conduct violates an environmental quality standard issued by
some agency other than the four specified ones;80 and (2) suits,
such as the instant one, to enjoin conduct which allegedly
"materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely
affect the environment."8 7
a. Vagueness
This latter definition of pollution could conceivably be chal-
lenged on the ground that it is so vague that a person cannot
84. CoNs. REGS. 75 (a); accord, CoNs. REGS. 77 (7.6).
85. Application of Herbert Schultz, proceedings before Minn. Dep't
Conservation, P.A. 69-346 (Oct. 7, 1969), Transcript at 43-44. Conserva-
tionists argued that the permit to dredge the channel should be de-
nied because the applicants planned to build summer homes on nearby
shoreland but had failed to provide for adequate lot sizes or sewage
disposal The Department said that, in its opinion, it has no control
over those factors.
86. The complaint in this hypothetical case did not allege a viola-
tion of any environmental quality regulation. If it had alleged that
Corporation Y was in violation of the county shoreland protection
ordinance, then assuming the county ordinance is not accorded the
status of a DNR environmental quality standard, the case would
have still been controlled by the second paragraph of MINN. STAT.§ 116B.04, not the first paragraph.
87. M.N. SAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
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reasonably estimate whether his conduct will be actionable.
It is suggested, however, that, while not precise, this definition
is certain enough to withstand the constitutional attack of
vagueness.8 8
In Minnesota, decisions on the constitutional requirements
of statutory certainty have varied. In some criminal cases, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has tended to be stringent and re-
quire a statute to give fairly explicit warning.8 In other cases,
however, the supreme court has shown greater flexibility. For
example, in City of St. Paul v. Haugbro,90 a case involving a
vagueness challenge to an ordinance prohibiting the discharge
of "dense smoke" from chimneys, the court said:
The terms used will be understood as commonly employed and
this court will understand by "dense smoke" . . . a volume of
88. But cf. Roberts v. State of Michigan, Civil No. 12428-C (Cir.
Ct., Ingham Cty., filed May 4, 1971). This case presented the question
of whether, under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, the op-
eration of motor vehicles is a major cause of pollution and, if so,
whether injunctive relief could be obtained against the State to prevent
the
further issuance of licenses to operators of motor vehicles, to
prevent the use of streets and highways, and to prevent the
use of tax monies for the construction of highways etc. until
sufficient safeguards, standards, rules and regulations are
adopted and enforced.
Id. at 1. The court held that "[a]t least as applied to the matter of
alleged pollution arising from the operation of motor vehicles," the
Act is unconstitutional. Id. at 3. However, the decision was not based
on the definition of pollution but on the fact that the Act "purports to
delegate legislative authority and responsibility to the courts." Id. at 3.
There are several reasons why this decision should be limited to Its
facts. First, neither party raised, briefed or argued any constitutional
issue. The decision to deny the relief did not require a decision on
any constitutional issue, since it could simply have been denied as a
matter of equitable discretion. Second, even if the holding is proper, it
only invalidates the Act in a narrow factual situation-where the plain-
tiff requests the court to overrule standards set by the legislature
itself. But even this may be qualified since the plaintiffs in Roberts
were asking the court to enforce legislative standards contained in the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Letter from Joseph L. Sax to
John M. Broeker, Sept. 14, 1971, on file with Mr. Broeker in Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
89. State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156 N.W.2d 908
(1968). The court answered a vagueness challenge to a Sunday Closing
statute by stating that it would follow the rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):
[A criminal] statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation, violates the first essential of due process of law.
90. 93 Minn. 59, 100 N.W. 470 (1904).
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dark, dense smoke as it comes from the smoke stack or chim-
ney .... 91
The Rights Act, however, provides only a "civil remedy"9 2 and,
therefore, the courts in Minnesota would presumably show even
greater tolerance. Hopefully, Minnesota courts will adopt the
reasoning of the Texas Court of Appeals in Houston Compressed
Steel v. Texas.93 That case involved the alleged lack of speci-
ficity in a statute defining "air pollution" as
the presence in the atmosphere of one or more air contaminents
or combinations thereof, in such concentration and of such du-
ration as are or may tend to be injurious or to adversely affect
human health or welfare, animal life, vegetation or property,
or as to interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of animal
life, vegetation or property.94
The court answered the vagueness challenge by saying
[t]he science of air pollution control is new and inexact, and
these standards are difficult to devise, but if they are to be
effective they must be broad. If they are too precise they will
provide easy escape for those who wish to circumvent the law.9 5
b. Burden of Proof
At this point, the plaintiffs must go forward and establish
a "prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has,
or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or destruction"
of natural resources in the state.9 0 There is no doubt that the
plaintiffs will have the initial burden of production, since it is
only after the prima facie showing is established that the
Rights Act specifies that "the defendant may rebut the prima
facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. '*-,
91. Id. at 63, 100 N.W. at 472. Cf. Walker v. Corwin, 210 Minn.
337, 300 N.W. 800 (1941). That case involved the revocation of a license
to practice veterinary medicine. The court upheld a statute which
made "gross moral or professional misconduct" grounds for revocation.
In answering the challenge that such a standard is defective due to
vagueness, the court said:
Mere difficulty in ascertaining whether close cases fall within
its operation does not nullify a statute if by the measure
stated it can be determined with reasonable certainty whether
particular conduct is disapproved.
Id. at 340, 300 N.W. at 801.
92. AnUN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1971).
93. 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1970).
94. TEx. REv..CIv. STAT. art. 4477-5, § 1.03(3) (1971).
95. 456 S.W.2d at 774. It is likely that the point in time at which
an injunction is sought will have an impact on the issue of vagueness.
If a defendant has already invested considerable time and money, the
courts would probably take a more restrictive position than if the con-
duct at issue were only at an early stage.
96. MIm. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
97. Id.
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It also appears that the overall burden of persuasion is on the
plaintiffs. At one point during the House subcommittee hear-
ings, the bill contained a provision explicitly shifting this bur-
den to the defendant if the above prima facie showing were
established.9 8  However, this provision was subsequently de-
leted and, as the second paragraph of Section 116B.04 now
stands, there is no suggestion that the overall burden of per-
suasion has been shifted to the defendant.9
A closely connected question, which may arise under either
the first or second paragraphs of Section 116B.04, is the
meaning of "prima facie showing." There are two distinguish-
able senses in which this phrase is generally used. First, it is
used to refer to the rule that when evidence has been advanced
by the party bearing the risk of nonpersuasion upon an issue,
this advancement will not only sustain that burden, but also
shift the duty of going forward with the evidence to the ad-
verse party. As used in this sense, "prima facie showing"
works as a presumption such that if the adverse party fails to
produce at least some evidence, the party establishing the prima
facie showing prevails. 0 0 Second, "prima facie showing" is
used to refer to a production of evidence advanced by the
party bearing the risk of nonpersuasion upon an issue such as
will entitle him to have that issue tried by the jury. In this
sense, it means that the proponent on an issue has advanced
sufficient evidence to relieve him of the hazard of nonsuit or a
directed verdict.10 1
Although Section 116B.04 does not specify in which sense it
is using "prima facie showing," there are several reasons to
conclude that it is being used in the latter one. First, Section
116B.10(3) states that, in an action to challenge the adequacy
of an environmental regulation, "if the plaintiff fails to es-
tablish said prima facie showing, the court shall dismiss the
action ... ." Although this is not specifically stated in Section
116B.04, the situation is identical. This use of "prima facie
showing" is more consistent with the second definition set out
above, although it is not completely inconsistent with the first
98. H.F. 284, as passed by the House Judiciary Committee, March
22, 1971.
99. For a discussion of burden of proof in environmental litigation,
see Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105-22 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970).
100. 9 J. WiGMoRE, EViDENcE § 2494(1), at 293 (3d ed. 1940).
101. Id. at § 2494(2), at 293-94.
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one. Second, less evidence is generally required to satisfy the
second type of prima facie showing. This is consistent with
one of the primary goals of the Rights Act, namely, "to provide
an adequate civil remedy to protect" natural resources in the
state.102  Finally, the second paragraph of Section 116B.04
states that the defendant "may rebut" the prima facie showing.
This implies that no dismissal occurs if the defendant chooses
not to rebut the prima facie showing. Such a result is consistent
only with the second use of "prima facie showing."
c. Defenses
Besides simply submitting rebuttal evidence, the second
paragraph of Section 116B.04 also provides that the defendant
may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is
no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is
consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the
public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's para-
mount concern for the protection of its air, water, land and
other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion.
Like other affirmative defenses, this one is procedurally gov-
erned by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03. It must be
specifically pleaded or, unless the pleading is later amended,
it is waived. 10 3 The overall burden of persuasion on the issue
rests with the defendant. 10 4 The defense does not contest the
allegation that the conduct at issue is causing pollution, but
rather it is a way to avoid liability even if the allegation is true.
In order to utilize this affirmative defense, it must be
shown that there is either no "feasible" alternative, or no
"prudent" alternative. To establish the former, it would be
necessary to show there is currently neither a technologically
better way to conduct the activity which is causing the pollution
nor a better method of cleaning up the polluting by-products of
this activity. Assuming that there is a "feasible" alternative,
the defendant would have to show that it is economically un-
102. MqINx. STAT. § 116B.01 (1971).
103. Melbo v. Rinn, 280 Minn. 72, 157 N.W.2d 842 (1968).
104. At one point during the 1971 legislative session, this paragraph
stated that, following a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that the
defendant's conduct was causing pollution, the defendant had the
burden of proving what is now called the affirmative defense. This
was later amended but without any significant change in the effect of
the paragraph. There is little, if any, difference between calling some-
thing an affirmative defense and specifically stating the defendant has
the burden of proving a certain defense.
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reasonable in light of the benefits to be derived from the activ-
ity in order to prove it is not a "prudent" alternative. 10 5
Even if the first part of the affirmative defense is proved,
the defendant must still establish that "the conduct at issue is
consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the
public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's para-
mount concern for the protection" of its natural resources.
Before it is decided if the conduct at issue satisfies this require-
ment, considerable balancing of interests is certain to take
place. For example, if the defendant were a large manufac-
turer, a number of jobs could be lost if the affirmative defense
were not established. The defendant could contend that the
public "welfare" certainly encompasses the provision of jobs.
On the other hand, the "public health" and the "state's para-
mount concern" for its natural resources demand that a court
closely scrutinize the effects of the alleged pollution.
As applied to the instant hypothetical, where the conduct
at issue is alleged to constitute pollution because it "materially
adversely affects" 10 6 the lake, the affirmative defense is not
incongruous with prior Minnesota law. In deciding whether
the defense has been satisfied, as well as if there is, in fact,
pollution, the courts will be balancing many of the considera-
tions which they have taken into account in the past in deciding
whether a nuisance has been committed. 01 However, the sec-
ond paragraph of Section 116B.04 also encompasses cases where
the conduct at issue is alleged to constitute pollution because
105. This interpretation is similar to the one announced by the
United States Supreme Court regarding the requirement of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (Supp.
1972) ) that the Secretary of the Department not provide funds for con-
structing highways using public parkland unless there is no "feasible
and prudent" alternative. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971), rev'ing 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir.), afj'ing 309 F. Supp.
1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). It held that an alternate route, which would
not require the use of the parkland in question, is "feasible" unless
its use would be against the principles of "sound engineering."
401 U.S. at 411. An alternate route was said to be "prudent" unless its
use involved "cost or community disruption ... [of) extraordinary
magnitudes." Id. at 413.
106. MiNw. STAT. § 116B.05(5) (1971).
107. See Fish v. Hanna Coal & Ore Corp., 164 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1958); Excelsior Baking Co. v. City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387,
77 N.W.2d 188 (1956); Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d
1 (1947); Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 4
N.W.2d 346 (1942); Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn.
374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919). See also W. PRossm, LAW OF TORTS § 87
(4th ed. 1971).
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it violates an "environmental quality standard"10 8 of some unit
of government other than the four specified state agencies. As
applied to this type of case, the affirmative defense is rather
novel since it is a statutory affirmative defense to the violation
of statutes and ordinances dealing with environmental protec-
tion.
The second paragraph of Section 116B.04 ends with the
statement that "[e] conomic considerations alone shall not con-
stitute a defense hereunder." It is not clear from the statute
itself whether this was intended to qualify only the affirmative
defense or whether it was intended to apply to any defenses
raised in any action controlled by the second paragraph.'0 9
However, the legislative history indicates that it was intended
to qualify only the specified affirmative defense.110 The exact
effect this provision has on the affirmative defense is also un-
clear. To the extent that the first part of the affirmative
defense is considered an economic factor and the second part
a noneconomic one, the provision in question could be read as
reinforcing the fact that both parts of the defense must be
proved in order to satisfy its requirements. However, this in-
terpretation would make the sentence in question essentially
superfluous, a result which the Minnesota Supreme Court has
stated should be avoided where possible."' Alternatively, the
sentence in question could be interpreted as applying to the
whole second paragraph. If so, an alleged polluter would be
unable to avail himself of any defense which is based on eco-
nomic considerations alone.
This latter interpretation raises the question of whether
there are any other defenses available in cases controlled by
the second paragraph. There are two reasons why a court
could conclude there are no other defenses. First, the language
in the second paragraph suggests such a result. After the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, "the defendant may
rebut the prima facie showing" and "may also show, by way of
an affirmative defense . . . ." Second, it is unlikely that the
legislature intended to provide an additional defense to alleged
108. Mn-n. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
109. A very unlikely, but theoretically possible, interpretation is
that it qualifies defenses raised in actions controlled by both the first
and second paragraphs.
110. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
111. Gale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345, 349, 37 N.W.
2d 711, 715 (1949); Hall Hardware Co. v. Gage, 197 Minn. 619, 622,
268 N.W. 202, 204 (1936).
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polluters. It is more likely that the specified affirmative defense
was intended to be the only defense to an actual case of pollu-
tion.
3. Relief
Assuming the plaintiff has proved that the conduct at issue
has caused or is likely to cause pollution, that the defendant has
failed to satisfy the requirements of the affirmative defense and
that there are no other applicable defenses, the court must de-
cide on the request for a permanent injunction. Such relief
is certainly available under the Rights Act, which provides that
the court
may grant declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equi-
table relief, or may impose such conditions upon a party as are
necessary or appropriate to protect the air, water, land or other
natural resources located within the state from pollution, im-
pairment, or destruction." 2
This provision gives a court considerable statutory discretion
to mold an appropriate remedy. In the instant hypothetical,
some combination of an injunction and/or order to adopt an
improved method of sewage disposal would clearly be author-
ized by this provision."13
C. A SUIT FOR VIOLATION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL PERMIT
Corporation X is a Minnesota manufacturer of frozen and
canned vegetables. It grows its own produce and in the
process sprays its crops with DDT. Because of the possible
danger DDT poses to human health and the definite threat it
presents to fish and wildlife, the use of this chemical has been
restricted to persons who have been issued permits by the Minn-
esota Department of Agriculture." 4  Corporation X currently
holds such a permit which regulates the time and manner of
spraying and requires that the user take all reasonable precau-
tions in spraying to prevent the spread of the pesticide to land
other than its own.
A conservation group, some members of which own land
adjacent to the fields of Corporation X, has filed suit in the
state district court under the authority of Section 116B.03 of the
Rights Act. The complaint alleges that the corporation is vio-
112. MINN. STAT. § 116B.07 (1971).
113. For a further discussion of relief available under Section
116B.07, see text accompanying notes 167-72 infra.
114. MmN. STAT. § 18.032 (1969).
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lating its permit by not taking all reasonable steps to ensure
against the spread of the pesticide and that this conduct is the
cause of DDT spreading from the defendant's fields to adjacent
land, thereby endangering the wildlife which inhabit that land.
It is further alleged that this constitutes "pollution, impairment
or destruction," which is defined as
[a]ny conduct by any person which violates, or is likely to
violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, regula-
tion, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit of
the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political subdivision
thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur .... 115
The plaintiff has requested a temporary injunction prohibiting
the immediate use of DDT by the defendant, and is seeking, in
addition, a permanent injunction and damages.
1. Motion to Dismiss
Initially, the defendant corporation would probably move
for a dismissal, relying on that part of Section 116B.03 (1)
which provides that
no action shall be allowable under this section for conduct taken
by a person pursuant to any environmental quality standard
S.. or permit issued by the pollution control agency, depart-
ment of natural resources, department of health or department
of agriculture.
The contention would be that no action can be maintained
under the authority of Section 116B.03 since the conduct at issue
is governed by an environmental quality permit issued by the
Department of Agriculture.
However, the provision in question requires that the con-
duct be pursuant to such permit, not merely governed by it.
The legislative history shows that this provision was intended
to protect, to some degree,116 reliance upon and compliance
with such standards and permits. Only if the defendant can
prove that there has been no violation of the permit would a
dismissal at this point be proper. This would require a showing
115. MmIw. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
116. The reason this provision provides only partial protection is
that the standard or permit can be challenged as inadequate to protect
the environment by an action brought under the authority of Section
116B.10 of the Rights Act. In addition, Section 116B.10(3) permits the
court to grant temporary relief; even though compliance with an en-
vironmental standard issued by the four specified agencies is a com-
plete defense to actions brought under Section 116B.03, the conduct
could be temporarily enjoined in a Section 116B.10 proceeding. For
additional discussion of this, see Part I D4(b) infra.
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by the defendant that he was entitled to a summary judg-
ment." 7 The provision in question is not a bar to suits contest-
ing whether the conduct at issue is in compliance with an
environmental quality permit of one of the four specified
agencies. It will, however, protect to some extent n" a defendant
who can sufficiently demonstrate that his conduct is in com-
pliance with such a permit from actions where it is alleged that
his conduct "materially adversely affects"" 9 some natural re-
source, even if the allegation is true.
2. Remittance
The next pre-trial issue is whether the case should be re-
mitted to an administrative proceeding within the Department
of Agriculture. This issue is controlled by Section 116B.08(1),
which provides that
[i]f administrative, licensing, or other similar proceedings are
required to determine the legality of the defendants' conduct,
the court shall remit the parties to such proceedings. [Emphasis
added.]
If such proceedings are only "available," the court "may" re-
mit.120
a. "Required" or "Available"
The immediate question is by what standards a court should
decide whether the administrative proceedings are "required"
or only "available." Such proceedings could conceivably be
"required" by due process, statutes, internal agency rules or
some combination of these. Inasmuch as the statute itself pro-
vides no clue, the purposes behind Section 116B.08 must be
looked to for enlightenment. Although one of the central pur-
poses underlying statutes such as the Rights Act is to increase
the power of the courts in the area of environmental protec-
tion,12  Section 116B.08 is a limitation on that purpose and
117. Minn. Rules Civ. P., Rule 56.03 would require that the de-
fendant prove "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that ... [he] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
118. See note 116 supra.
119. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
120. Id. at § 116B.08(1).
121. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970). Professor
Sax sets forth a number of reasons for increasing the role of the courts
in the area of environmental disputes. Id. at 108-24. First, as com-
pared with governmental departments and administrative agencies, the
courts are "outsiders." Id. at 108. The courts are less amenable to
political pressures than agencies. In addition, while the selection of
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contemplates coordination between courts and agencies. It is
suggested that this coordination can best be effected in the
following manner. Remittance would be "required" where the
gist of the action is an alleged violation of an environmental
quality standard, regulation or permit if the agency which is-
sued it would be required-by due process or statute-to hold
a hearing before it could take affirmative action itself for a
violation of that standard, regulation or permit. In any other
situation, remittance would be deemed "available."
The instant hypothetical would be a case of mandatory
remittance under this scheme, since the Department of Agricul-
ture would be required by statute to hold a hearing before
revoking the permit granted to Corporation X.122 This is a
determination of the past or present legality of the conduct at
issue. An example of nonmandatory remittance would be
where there is no environmental standard regulation or per-
mit applicable to the type of conduct at issue and where
the defendant is accused of "materially adversely"12 3 affecting
the environment. The court could remit the case to an agency
which has the power to promulgate standards or regulations
encompassing the type of conduct at issue, and this would, in
effect, be calling for a determination by the agency of the future
legality of the type of conduct at issue.1 2 4
b. Criteria for Non-Mandatory Remittance
In cases where the court concludes that remittance is not
members of administrative bodies which deal with environmental mat-
ters is based, at least in part, on the reactions of various pressure
groups towards the candidates, the same does not hold true for the
selection of most judges. Because such a small part of any one judge's
time will be spent on environmental cases, the appointment of judges
will not be based on their attitudes towards environmental protection.
Second, because no judge will deal exclusively with environmental
cases, there will be less pressure to strike some kind of balance between
the various parties that are involved in such cases. Id. at 109-10.
Third, the judicial process provides private citizens a chance to initiate
actions to protect the environment, not merely to participate in
agency hearings. Id. at 110-11. Finally, enlarging the sphere of judi-
cial activity in this area does not entail restricting the activities of other
institutions which are or may be established to protect the environ-
ment. Id. at 113.
122. Anux. STAT. § 18.036(2) (1969).
123. I iNN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
124. Under the Administrative Procedure Act's classification, this
would be a proceeding for the adoption of a "rule" while the previously
mentioned proceedings would be "contested cases." See MIN. ST.
§ 15.0411(3) & (4) (1969).
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required it must be determined by what criteria a court should
decide whether to remit. The statute provides no indication
of how a court should do this. It is therefore suggested that,
since this situation is the same as the one a court faces when
passing on questions of primary jurisdiction,'12 5 the same policy
considerations which are used to resolve that issue should be
applied here. Where remitting to an administrative agency
will take advantage of some particular expertise of that agency
and help attain uniformity of application of regulatory statutes,
a court should remit.126 In practice, there will be few cases
which are not remitted.
3. Temporary Injunctions
A request for a temporary injunction may be governed by
either Section 116B.07 or Section 116B.08(l), depending upon
whether the case is remitted. If it is remitted, Section
116B.08(1) controls, while if it is not, Section 116B.07 governs
the request. Section 116B.07 is the general provision for rem-
edies in actions brought under Section 116B.03. It provides
that the court may grant temporary equitable relief and that
in such a case "it may require the plaintiff to post a bond
sufficient to indemnify the defendant for damages suffered be-
cause of the temporary relief, if permanent relief is not
granted." There is no requirement that the plaintiff show that
an irreparable injury will occur if the temporary injunction is
not granted. In contrast, Section 116B.08(1) provides that
where the case is remitted "the court may grant temporary
equitable relief where appropriate to prevent irreparable in-
jury" to natural resources in the state. There is no provision
here for the posting of a bond or other security.
The issues which arise from these two sections with respect
to granting temporary injunctions are: (1) Is there a need to
show that an irreparable injury will occur unless a temporary
injunction is granted before such relief can be granted under
Section 116B.07; and (2) Can the court impose a requirement
that a plaintiff post security before granting a temporary in-
junction under Section 116B.08(l)? The answer to the first
question is probably no while the answer to the second is yes.
125. See 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 561-72 (1965);
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01 (1958).
126. See State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, 236 Minn.
452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952); 2 F. CooPTE, supra note 125, at 563; 3 K.
DAVIS, supra note 125, § 19.01 at 5.
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There are three reasons why, in cases which are not remit-
ted, there should be no requirement that the plaintiff prove
that an irreparable injury will occur before a temporary in-
junction can be granted. First, Minnesota case law, while
employing the phrase "irreparable injury," has considerably
qualified its meaning. The evidence needed to sustain such a
showing was expressly relaxed over 65 years ago by the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.12 7  Since then, it has been held that,
where a barn located in a city gave off noxious odors and
where the damage to nearby property owners was hard to
measure, the injury was irreparable.128 "Irreparable injury"
has also been defined at various times as a "real and serious
injury,"' 29 and recently, in a case involving an appeal from a
temporary injunction rather than the issuance of one,13 0 the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in refusing to revoke the injunction,
stated:
It is questionable whether our failure to further restrain the
conciliator would result in any injury which is literally "irrep-
arable." There is, however, a very great likelihood such injury
might be real and substantial.13'
Second, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 65.01 and 65.02
strongly suggest that, except in one situation, there is no stat-
utory requirement of an "irreparable injury." Until 1968, when
these rules became effective, the issuance of temporary injunc-
tions was controlled by Chapter 585 of the statutes. There was
no mention in that chapter of the phrase "irreparable injury."
It is, however, part of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
65.01, and Rule 65 supersedes Chapter 585 to the extent incon-
sistent.132 Rule 65.01 requires a showing of irreparable injury
before a temporary injunction can be issued without first giving
written or oral notice to the adverse party. But, Rule 65.02,
which controls the issuance of temporary injunctions in all
other situations, does not refer to such a showing.
Finally, in order to obtain a temporary injunction under
127. Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 101 Minn. 271, 276-77, 112 N.W. 274, 276
(1907); Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn_ 386, 392, 111 N.W. 295, 297
(1907).
128. Lead v. Inch, 116 Minn. 467, 473-74, 134 N.W. 218, 220 (1912).
129. Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 5, 60 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1953);
City of Jordan v. Leonard, 119 Minn. 162, 164, 137 N.W. 740, 741 (1912).
See also Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 994, 1001-04 (1965).
130. Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 46,
144 N.W.2d 789 (1966).
131. Id. at 49, 144 N.W.2d at 791.
132. 3 J. HEmAim & 0. ADAMSON, MnIEsOTA PRAcTIcE 101 (1970).
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the Rights Act in cases where the court remits the parties to
an administrative proceeding, a showing of an irreparable in-
jury is required. Both Section 116B.08(1) and Section 116B.10
(3) state that where the court remits, it "may grant temporary
equitable relief where appropriate to prevent irreparable injury
to the air, water, land, or other natural resources located with-
in the state." In contrast, Section 116B.07 has no such require-
ment. This certainly suggests that such a showing is only
required under the Rights Act where a case is remitted. Such
a system is also quite logical from a policy standpoint. If a case
is remitted, it will take considerably longer for a final decision
to be rendered by the court than if there is no remittance. This
delay increases the possible harm which a defendant might
suffer as a result of the injunction and justifies the requirement
of a stronger showing before a temporary injunction is issued.
The second issue raised is whether a court can require the
posting of security before granting a temporary injunction.
Since many potential plaintiffs under the Rights Act could find
it impossible to post such security, 13 3 the issue is a significant
one. However, there are two reasons why there is virtually
no chance that such a requirement would be held inapplicable
to cases controlled by Section 116B.08(1). First, Section 116B.07
specifically provides that the court "may require the plaintiff
to post a bond." There is nothing in Section 116B.08(l) which
in any way qualifies this. Second, even though the Rights Act
apparently gives the court discretion as to whether to require
security, such an interpretation would conflict with and proba-
bly be overruled by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 65.03 (1),
which provides:
No temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be
granted except upon the giving of security by the applicant,
in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Even before the adoption of Rule 65.03, when Section 585.04
completely controlled the question of security for a temporary
133. Minnesota law limits the recovery of damages caused by a
temporary injunction to the amount of the security which the court or-
dered posted. MXNN. RuLEs Civ. P., Rule 65.03(1). See Northwest
Hotel Corp. v. Henderson, 257 Minn. 87, 90, 100 N.W.2d 493, 496 (1959);
Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 328, 46 N.W.2d 654, 660 (1951). Be-
cause of this and because the subject of many temporary injunctions
will be large businesses, the amount of the required security could be
above the means of many plaintiffs.
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injunction, the Minnesota Supreme Court uniformly held that
such security was mandatory.13 4
4. Trial, Burden of Proof and Defenses
Assuming for the moment that the instant hypothetical
case is not remitted, it would then advance to trial. The burden
of proof and, possibly, the question of which defenses are avail-
able would be governed by the first paragraph of Section
116B.04, which provides:
In any action maintained under section [116B.03], where
the subject of the action is conduct governed by any environ-
mental quality standard ... or permit promulgated or issued
by the pollution control agency, department of natural re-
sources, department of health, or department of agriculture,
whenever the plaintiff shall have made a prima facie showing
that the conduct of the defendant violates or is likely to violate
said environmental quality standard ... or permit, the defend-
ant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of
evidence to the contrary.135
The burden of proof issue is essentially the same here as in
actions controlled by the second paragraph of Section 116B.04,1 30
but there is a difference between these paragraphs with respect
to which defenses are available. In actions controlled by the
second paragraph, it is clear that at least the specified affirma-
tive defense is available. 3 7 On the other hand, there are no
defenses mentioned in the first paragraph, and furthermore,
the language of the second paragraph seems to preclude the
possibility of the specified affirmative defense being applicable
to cases controlled by the first paragraph. 138 This could be
interpreted to mean that there are no defenses and that the
only course open to a defendant in a case governed by the first
paragraph is to prove that there has been no violation of the
134. See cases cited in note 133 supra.
135. There is, however, a qualification of this in the same para-
graph to the effect that, where the environmental quality standards,
limitations or permits of any of the aforementioned agencies are in-
consistent or conflict, the most stringent shall control.
This provision could itself conflict with the provision in Section
116B.03 (1), which provides that compliance with an environmental qual-
ity standard of one of the four specified agencies is a defense. Where
there are two applicable standards, the most stringent would probably
have to be complied with in order to utilize that defense.
136. See Part IH B2(b) supra
137. See Part I B2 (c) supra
138. The second paragraph begins by stating 'in any other action
maintained under section 3 . .. ." Mnr. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971). This
strongly implies that what follows, including the specified affirmative
defense, does not apply to the first paragraph.
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standard or permit. However, since there is no mention in the
first paragraph of any defense, it could be argued that any de-
fenses available in a similar action not maintained under Sec-
tion 116B.03 are available here.139
5. Retention of Jurisdictional Following Remittance
If the case is remitted, the court retains jurisdiction pending
completion of the administrative proceedings. This is true wheth-
er it is a case of mandatory or discretionary remittance. 140
In this respect, Section 116B.08 differs considerably from the
procedure usually followed where a court is faced with a pri-
mary jurisdiction question. In such a situation, the court has
discretion to dismiss once it determines that an administrative
agency or governmental department should initially proceed. 14 1
After the administrative proceedings have been completed,
Section 116B.08 (2) specifies that the court
shall adjudicate the impact of the defendants' conduct, program,
or product on the air, water, land or other natural resources
located within the state in accordance with the preceeding sec-
tions [116B.02] through [116B.07].
In addition, Subdivision 2 provides that "in such adjudication,
the court may order that additional evidence be taken to the
extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act."
a. Relationship Between Subdivision 2 and Subdivision 3
of Section 116B.08
According to Subdivision 2, the court is supposed to "adju-
dicate the impact of the defendants' conduct . . . in accordance
with the preceding sections 2 through 7." Since all of those
sections relate to civil actions, Subdivision (2) may be read as
a directive to the court to continue the civil action and not
merely to review the agency determination once the case is
returned from the agency. On the other hand, Subdivision 3
states:
Where, as to any such administrative, licensing, or other
similar proceedings referred to above, judicial review thereof
139. Examples of defenses which may be available in actions
brought for the violation of environmental quality standards or per-
mits issued by one of the four specified agencies include: (1) that the
standard or permit amounts to a taking; (2) that, as applied to the de-
fendant, it is unreasonable or arbitrary; and (3) that the defendant, for
a variety of reasons, is entitled to a variance.
140. MiNN. STAT. § 116B.08(1) (1971).
141. See 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 125, § 19.01, at 9-10.
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is available, not withstanding any other provisions of law to
the contrary, the court originally taking jurisdiction shall main-
tain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
This subdivision obviously does not refer to a continuation of
the civil action, but rather to review of the agency determination
of the legality of the conduct at issue.
One thing these subdivisions make clear is that the review
of the agency decision concerning the legality of the defendant's
conduct and the adjudication of the impact which such conduct
will have on the environment are two separate judicial func-
tions. The question which arises is how these two subdivisions
can be interpreted so that a workable system is formed. It is
suggested that this problem should be analyzed from the per-
spective of the three basic types of actions which could be in-
volved in remittance under Section 116B.08: (1) cases where
the conduct at issue is alleged to be in violation of an environ-
mental quality standard or permit of one of the four specified
agencies;142 (2) cases where an environmental quality standard
or permit of any other agency is alleged to have been violated;1 43
and (3) cases where the conduct at issue is alleged to be 'ma-
terially adversely" affecting the environment.1 44
In actions brought for violation of an environmental quality
standard or permit issued by one of the four specified agencies:
(1) The agency to which the case is remitted could determine
that the standard or permit is being violated by the con-
duct at issue. If so, the defendant would most likely appeal
that decision.145
(a) If the court affirms the agency's decision, it must
find that the conduct at issue constitutes "pollution,
impairment or destruction" of the environment.146
(b) If the court reverses the agency's decision, it must
dismiss since no action can be maintained under Sec-
tion 116B.03 of the Rights Act where the conduct at
issue is found to be pursuant to an environmental
142. See Mum. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. If there is no appeal of that decision, then the court would be
likely to adopt the decision of the agency, thereby necessitating a
finding that the conduct at issue constitutes pollution, impairment or
destruction of the environment under Section 116B.02 (5) of the Rights
Act.
146. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
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quality standard or permit of one of the four speci-
fied agencies. 147
In light of these two alternatives there would be no point
to literally "adjudicate the impact of the defendants' con-
duct" on the environment "in accordance with the preceding
section 2 through 7'14s If there is found to be no violation,
the suit is dismissed. While if a violation is found, the only
steps remaining to the court are to determine if there is any
defense which might excuse the violation and, if not, what
relief will be granted.
(2) Alternatively, the agency to which the case is remitted
could decide that the standard or permit has not been
violated.
(a) This gives rise to the exact same possible series of
events and outcomes as are set out above, with the
exception that the plaintiff rather than the defendant
will be the party appealing the agency decision.
(b) In a case where the defendant appeals, the judicial
review would be governed by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA)149 since the Rights Act does not
speak to the procedure by which such an appeal can
be effected. The same would hold true for a plaintiff
who appeals, if such plaintiffs are held to be "ag-
147. Id. at § 116B.03(1).
148. Id. at § 116B.08(2).
149. MT=. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.0426 (1969). The defendant can clearly
get judicial review of an adverse agency decision in a case remitted
under Section 116B.08 of the Rights Act whether the agency proceed-
ing involves a "contested case" or the adoption of a "rule." Section
15.0411(4) of the APA defines a "contested case" as "a proceeding
before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of spe-
cific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be deter-
mined after an agency hearing." It is reasonably certain that, where a
defendant is charged with violating an environmental quality standard
or permit, there is a "contested case." By virtue of the adverse deci-
sion, the defendant is an "aggrieved" person within the meaning of Sec-
tion 15.0424(1) and could therefore obtain judicial review under that
section.
If it were determined that an agency proceeding, in a case remitted
under Section 116B.08, involved a rule-making proceeding, a defendant
who received what was considered an adverse decision could prob-
ably obtain judicial review under Section 15.0416 of the APA.
Section 15.0425(1) of the APA provides for judicial review of
such agency proceedings for "[a]ny person aggrieved by a final deci-
sion in a contested case .... ." And the defendant would most defi-
nitely be an "aggrieved" person. The scope of judicial review in such
an appeal would be governed by Section 15.0425 of the APA.
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grieved" persons under the APA. 15 It is very likely
that the courts will hold that plaintiffs appealing
from an adverse agency decision rendered after a
case is remitted are "aggrieved" persons. 5 '
In actions brought for violation of an environmental quality
standard or permit issued by an agency other than one of the
four specified ones:
(1) The agency to which the case is remitted could determine
that the standard or permit has been violated. If so, the
defendant would most likely appeal that decision.15 2
(a) If the court affirms the agency's decision, it must
find that the conduct at issue constitutes "pollution,
impairment or destruction" of the environment be-
cause an environmental quality standard has been
violated.15 3
(b) If the court reverses the agency's decision, it would
not automatically dismiss, since compliance with en-
vironmental quality standards or permits, other than
ones issued by one of the four specified agencies, is
not a defense under the Rights Act.
It is asserted that in both of the above situations, the court must
proceed to "adjudicate the impact of the defendants' conduct"
on the environment in accordance with Sections 116B.02 through
116B.07 of the Act. 54 If the court affirms the agency's decision,
the defendant may well appeal to the Minnesota Supreme
Court.15 In case the district court decision is reversed by the
supreme court, the fact that the supreme court might ultimately
find the defendant to be in compliance with the standard or
permit would not preclude a decision prohibiting the conduct
at issue, for compliance with such a standard is not a defense.
If the impact of the defendant's conduct had not been adjudicated
below, the supreme court would have to remand to the district
150. M1nn. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1969).
151. There are several reasons why a plaintiff receiving an adverse
agency decision in such a case should be considered an "aggrieved"
person. First, Section 116B.01 of the Rights Act states that "each per-
son is entitled by right' to the protection of the environment. Second,
in order to implement that right, Section 116B.03 (1) of the Rights Act
permits any person to maintain a civil action against any other person.
Finally, the agency decision, if wrong, will have an adverse affect
on the environment.
152. See note 145 supra.
153. lmNN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
154. Id. at § 116B.08 (2).
155. Mnm. STAT. § 15.0426 (1969).
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court for further proceedings. This remand could be avoided
by requiring the district court to originally perform that adjudica-
tion.
If the district court reverses the agency's decision and finds
there has been no violation, it must still adjudicate the impact
of the conduct at issue. This is a situation where, at least as it
involves the defendant, even if an environmental quality stand-
ard or permit is being complied with, the court can prohibit the
conduct at issue.15 6 The court would probably base its decision
on whether the conduct "materially adversely affects" the en-
vironment.157
(2) The agency to which the case is remitted could determine
that the standard or permit has not been violated. This
would give rise to the exact same possible series of events
and outcomes as are set out above, with the exception
that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, would be
the one which appeals the agency decision.
Finally, there are cases where the conduct at issue is al-
leged to be "materially adversely" affecting the environment,1 8
and there is no standard or permit which can be said to have
been violated. 59 However, the court could remit in order to
allow an agency which has the power the chance to promulgate
an environmental quality standard. If the agency declines to
do so, the court would simply continue the original civil ac-
tion. 160 If the agency adopts a new standard, either the de-
156. This procedure allows a plaintiff under the Rights Act to
challenge the adequacy of an environmental quality standard or permit
other than one issued by one of the four specified agencies; but this
challenge involves only one person. Only the actual defendant is di-
rectly affected, although others may change their conduct as a result
of such a decision. There is, however, no apparent way to challenge
the adequacy of a standard per se under the Rights Act except in ac-
tions brought under Section 116B.10, which are limited to suits against
state units of government or where Section 116B.09 is available.
157. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02(5) (1971).
158. Id.
159. This must be qualified in a case where there is no allegation
that an environmental quality standard or permit has been violated
but there is one which may have been.
160. The only possible exception would arise if one of the parties
appealed this refusal to issue a standard. The type of agency proceed-
ing, which would take place in a case where the court remits to
give an agency the opportunity to make a standard, would be very sim-
ilar to that which is contemplated in Section 15.0415 of the APA
That section governs petitions for the adoption of rules. The appeal
would probably have to be a mandamus action. See Baird, Judicial
Review of Administrative Procedures in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L. REv.
451, 458-59 (1962).
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fendant or the plaintiff will be likely to appeal, depending
upon the stringency of the standard.
If the defendant were to appeal, the APA would govern
the action.161 The plaintiff, on the other hand, may have a
choice. If a state agency is involved, the standard could be
challenged under Section 116B.10 of the Rights Act.162 If not,
the plaintiff could also appeal the new standard by way of the
APA163
If, for whatever reason, no standard is adopted, the court
will then adjudicate in accordance with Sections 116B.02
through 116B.07. On the other hand, if one is adopted, the
agency would probably also make a determination as to whether
the conduct at issue violates it. Should the court ultimately find
that the conduct is in compliance with the new environmental
quality standard, one of two things would occur. If the agency
which issued the standard is one of the four specified ones, the
court must dismiss. If some other agency is involved, the court
must adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the
environment.
Alternatively, if the court ultimately determines that the con-
duct violates the new standard, it must find that the conduct
constitutes "pollution, impairment or destruction" no matter
what agency issued the standard. However, if the agency is
not one of the four specified ones, the court should go on to
adjudicate the impact of the conduct. In the event that the
district court is reversed on the issue of whether the standard
was violated, the conclusions reached by the court in adjudi-
cating the impact of the conduct might not be reversed and
would support the relief awarded to the plaintiff.
b. Operation of Subdivision 2 of Section 116B.08
Whenever the court remits and later proceeds to adjudicate
the impact of the defendant's conduct in accordance with Sec-
tions 116B.02 through 116B.07,104 Subdivision 2 permits the
court to "order that additional evidence be taken to the extent
necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act." One
section which may be difficult to comply with literally is Sec-
tion 116B.04. Since Section 116B.08(2) will not really come into
161. MNN. STAT. §§ 15.0416, 15.0417 (1969).
162. See Part II D infra.
163. See note 179 infra.
164. AM-N. STAT. § 116B.08 (2) (1971).
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focus in cases involving violations of environmental quality
standards issued by one of the four specified agencies,'01 only
the second paragraph of Section 116B.04 is relevant here. It re-
quires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie showing that
the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to cause the pol-
lution, impairment, or destruction of . . . natural resources lo-
cated within the state.
If this provision were literally complied with, the court would
waste considerable time and effort since, presumably, much of
the evidence necessary to satisfy this requirement has already
been presented during the agency proceedings.
However, the problem is easily resolved by reading the
provision giving the court discretion as to what additional evi-
dence is required as controlling the submission of evidence by
the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, with respect to Section
116B.04. This provision also serves another purpose. It ensures
that the court is never restricted to the record submitted by
the agency. This in turn should contribute to the willingness
of courts to remit in cases where it is discretionary. The courts
gain the benefit of the agency's fact finding expertise, save time
in the process, and are still free to take any additional evidence
which is deemed necessary. 166
6. Relief
The plaintiff in the instant hypothetical has requested dam-
ages for the harm already caused by the defendant's alleged
misuse of DDT, as well as a permanent injunction to prevent
any further use of DDT by the defendant. Since Section 116B.07
specifically permits the court to grant permanent equitable
relief, there is no doubt that a permanent injunction is an
available remedy. However, the same cannot be said for the
damages remedy. If read alone, that issue seems to be left open
by Section 116B.12, which states:
No existing civil or criminal remedy for any wrongful action
shall be excluded or impaired by this act. The rights and reme-
dies provided herein shall be in addition to any administrative,
regulatory, statutory, or common law rights and remedies now
or hereafter available.
But there are several reasons for concluding that damages
are not available as a remedy in civil actions maintained under
165. See text following note 144 supra.
166. The fact that the court which remits a case retains jurisdic-
tion under Section 116B.08(3) should also contribute to the willing-
ness of courts to remit where such is discretionary.
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the Rights Act. First, the legislative history of the Act directly
contradicts any such notion. The drafters of the original bill
introduced into the 1971 legislative session intentionally omitted
reference to a damage remedy only after considerable debate.1 "7
During the 1971 legislative session an amendment was defeated
which would have added such a remedy. 68 Furthermore, the
bill which eventually became the Rights Act was generally
viewed, both by the legislature and the public, as a tool to pre-
vent further harm to the environment, not as a way to punish
persons for harm already done to natural resources in the
state.
0 9
Second, the language in the Rights Act which specifically
focuses on relief only mentions declaratory and equitable relief.
Section 116B.03(1), which controls the procedure for initiating
a civil action to enjoin pollution and enforce environmental
quality standards or permits, states that such an action can be
maintained "for declaratory or equitable relief." In addition,
Section 116B.07, which is the general provision governing relief
in such cases, does not appear to encompass such a remedy.
That section states, in part, that
[t]he court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and perma-
nent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions upon a
party as are necessary or appropriate to protect ... natural
resources located within the state ....
The latter part of this provision, permitting the imposition of
"necessary or appropriate" conditions, could arguably be read
to encompass a damage award if a court concluded such was
"necessary or appropriate to protect" the environment. How-
ever, the preferable interpretation, especially in light of the
legislative history of the Rights Act, would seem to be that
this language was intended to modify only the preceding forms
of relief, ensuring that the courts have maximum flexibility to
mold effective remedies. 170
Finally, there are two policy reasons why, if there is any
doubt concerning the availability of a damage remedy, the
167. See text following note 17 supra.
168. See text accompanying and following note 35 supra.
169. Interview with Rep. Roll Nelson, member of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Aug. 23, 1971.
170. Additional support for the proposition that a damage remedy
is not available is contained in Section 116B.10 (1), which controls the
initiation of civil actions against state agencies for issuance of environ-
mental quality standards or permits which are allegedly inadequate
to protect the environment. As is the case in Section 116B.03(1), such
actions can only be maintained "for declaratory or equitable relief."
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courts should decide the question against the inclusion of that
remedy. First, if courts are permitted to assess damages they
might refrain from also giving injunctive relief to protect the
environment. 171 Second, if there really is a danger that friv-
olous suits will be brought in excessive number under the Rights
Act, as some critics have claimed, 172 the availability of a damage
award would only increase this problem.
D. USE OF THE RIGHTS ACT TO CONTEST AN AGENCY ACTION
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (PCA) recently
completed hearings to establish a new standard for the sulfur
content of discharges into the air from industrial sources. Sub-
sequently, the PCA adopted a somewhat stricter standard than
the one previously in force. Company X, which discharges sul-
fur into the air as a by-product of its manufacturing process,
had testified in favor of retaining the old standard and has
decided to appeal the agency's decision. A conservation group
has also decided to contest the decision, on the ground that the
new standard is not strict enough.
1. Methods of Review
In the past, judicial review of an agency decision such as
the one set out above could be obtained by various methods, in-
cluding extraordinary writs, equitable actions, suits for dam-
ages and simply defending an agency's suit to enforce its de-
cision. 1 73 However, today, because of the increasing importance
of administrative agencies, as exemplified by the enactment of
the APA, and because writs which were formerly classed as
extraordinary 174 are now mainly controlled by statutes,175 the
171. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
This would be a possibility especially where the defendant is a large
employer and an injunction might result in the loss of a number of
jobs.
172. The Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry voiced
this concern during the House Judiciary Subcommittee meetings in
February of 1971. Interview with Richard N. Flint, chairman of the
Environmental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 9, 1971.
173. See generally Risenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in
Minnesota (pts. 1 & 2), 33 MiNw. L. REv. 569, 685 (1949) [The same
authors have a sequel to these articles in 36 MmAN. L. Rnv. 435 (1952) ].
174. As used in connection with obtaining judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions, extraordinary writs generally include certiorari,
declaratory judgment, injunction, mandamus, prohibition and quo war-
ranto. Id.
175. These extraordinary writs are now governed by the following
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methods for obtaining review of an agency decision like this
one are generally statutory. In the instant hypothetical case,
the use of extraordinary writs to obtain judicial review are
probably precluded.176  In any event, this section will concen-
trate on the use of the APA and the Rights Act to obtain
judicial review of the agency's decision.
a. Judicial Review under the APA
The APA provides two possible methods of judicial review
in this case. First, a declaratory judgment action could be
brought to determine the validity of the rule which the PCA
adopted.' 7 7 The main problem with this method from the point
statutes: (1) certiorari, MNn. STAT. §§ 606.01-.05 (1969); (2) declara-
tory judgment, MlwN. RuLEs Crv. P., Rule 57; (3) injunction, MIN.
STAT. §§ 585.01-.04 (1969); (4) mandamus, MxNN. STAT. §§ 586.01-.06
(1969); (5) prohibition, MINN. STAT. §§ 587.01-.05 (1969); and (6) quo
warranto, Mnq.aw. RULEs Civ. P., Rule 81.01 (2).
176. See Waters v. Putnam, 289 Minn. 165, 183 N.W.2d 545 (1971).
In that case, a group of landowners appealed the quashing by the
district court of their petition for a writ of certiorari and applied, in the
alternative, for a writ of mandamus to review an order of the Water
Resources Board which had established a new watershed district.
The court held that although Section 15.0424 of the APA provided forjudicial review of the agency's decision, that method of review was
lost because the 30-day appeal period had run before filing with the
district court. The court went on to say that "since a right of appeal
was accorded under the Administrative Procedure Act, the district
court was without jurisdiction to consider the matter on certiorari."
Id. at 169, 183 N.W.2d at 549. In addition, it was stated that "[t]he
possibility of a statutory appeal from an administrative action would
ordinarily seem to preclude resort to mandamus." Id. at 172, 183
N.W.2d at 550.
In light of these statements, the decision in Waters could be read
as precluding the use of extraordinary remedies in a case such as the
instant hypothetical. However, the decision is weakened somewhat by
the fact that the appeal period under the APA had already lapsed in
Waters. With respect to its statements regarding the unavailability of
both certiorari and mandamus, the court gave an alternative reason for
its decision, stating that "[tihe right to appeal having lapsed, appellants
cannot now do indirectly (by certiorari and mandamus) what they
failed to do directly by appeal." Id. at 172, 183 N.W.2d at 550. In
addition, the APA itself appears to conflict with the decision. The
section of the APA of which the plaintiffs failed to make timely use
states that "nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent resort
to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by
law now or hereafter enacted." MnN. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1969).
Finally, Waters only involves the use of an extraordinary writ as a
remedy within itself. It does not control the situation where a statute,
such as the Rights Act, incorporates extroardinary remedies-declara-
tory and injunctive relief--as a means of providing redress for viola-
tion of its provisions. See also Part I D 1 (b) infra.
177. MANl . STAT. § 15.0416 (1969). To the extent that the decision
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of view of a party appealing a new standard is that the scope
of review is rather narrow. 178 In addition, it is possible that
the conservation group may not have standing to bring this
petition.17 9 Second, it may be possible to use Section 15.0424
of the APA as a method of review. The scope of review for
this section is not as restrictive as the one which applies to pe-
titions for a declaratory judgment.1 80 However, only a "con-
tested case"'18 can be reviewed under Section 15.0424 while
the instant hypothetical involves a rule-making proceeding. 8 -'
in Waters precludes the use of declaratory judgments, only declaratory
judgments brought under Rule 57 would be affected. Nothing in Waters
restricts the operation of the APA in any way. To the contrary, it
makes an attempt to strengthen it.
178. MnMN. STAT. § 15.0417 (1969) provides:
In proceedings under section 15.0416 the court shall declare the
rule invalid if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions
or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or was adopted
without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures.
179. Section 15.0416 of the APA is available "when it appears
that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or
threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges
of the petitioner." (Emphasis added.)
It is possible that the conservation group could be held to have
no "legal rights or privileges" within the meaning of this section that
could be interfered with or threatened by the new standard. How-
ever, the Rights Act appears to have bestowed such rights, even if they
did not already exist, by stating that "each person is entitled by right to
the protection, preservation and enhancement of air, water, land and
other natural resources located within the state .... " MINN. STAT.
§ 116B.01 (1971).
180. MIN. STAT. § 15.0425 (1969), which provides in part:
t[T]he court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify
the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions are:(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
The significant difference between the scope of review in § 15.0417
and in this section is contained in Subsection (e) above. It provides a
party with an opportunity to challenge the basic soundness of the
agency action, an opportunity not provided for in Section 15.0417.
181. This is defined by Section 15.0411 (4) of the APA as:
a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, du-
ties or privileges of specific parties are required by law or con-
stitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.
182. A "rule" is defined by Section 15.0411 (3) as:
every regulation, including the amendment, suspension, or
repeal thereof, adopted by an agency, whether with or without
[Vol. 56:575
1972] ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT 621
b. Judicial Review under the Rights Act
Even though the APA could be used to obtain judicial re-
view, both parties are likely to at least consider the feasibility
of contesting the new standard under the authority of the
Rights Act. The question which then arises is whether the
existence of possible methods of obtaining judicial review under
the APA precludes resort to methods contained in the Rights
Act. This question appears to be resolved by Section 15.0424 (1)
of the APA, which governs judicial review in contested cases,
and where it is stated that "nothing in this section shall" abro-
gate any existing or subsequent methods of review or remedies.
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that one
statutory method of review is not foreclosed solely because
another is available.8 3 The only exception to this seems to be
that where the APA provides methods of review, statutory
methods which are codifications of common-law extraordinary
remedies are not available for obtaining judicial review.184
prior hearing, to implement or make specific the law enforced
or administered by it or to govern its organization or pro-
cedure ....
183. Bryan v. Community State Bank, 285 Binn. 226, 172 N.W.2d
771 (1969). Mr. Bryan had applied for a certificate of authority to
open a bank, which the Department of Commerce denied after holding
hearings on the application pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 45.07 (1969).
Although this section provides for review of such a denial by the
supreme court by way of certiorari, this method of review was un-
available to Mr. Bryan because of procedural errors. He appealed the
decision by way of Section 15.0424 of the APA. The district court re-
manded and the Department, after further consideration, reversed itself
and granted the certificate. This decision was contested by the Com-
munity State Bank, which requested and was granted certiorari under
M ni. STAT. § 45.07 (1969). The main issue was whether Mr. Bryan
should have been restricted to the use of Section 45.07 in contesting
the original decision by the Department denying the application for a
certificate. The supreme court held that both Section 45.07 and Sec-
tion 15.0424 were available to contest the decision even though one
method had been lost through procedural error. Id. at 230, 172 N.W.2d
774. See also Quinn Distributing Co., Inc. v. Quast Transfer, Inc.,
288 Minn. 442, 181 N.W.2d 696 (1970); Minneapolis Van and Warehouse
Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175
(1970).
184. See note 176 supra. It appears, however, that this exception
has its own exception. The decision in Waters strongly indicates that,
where the APA is available and provides a method of review, extra-
ordinary remedies such as certiorari and mandamus will be disallowed
as methods of obtaining judicial review. Bryan seems to qualify this
to the extent that such extraordinary remedies are incorporated into
statutes other than the specific statute which controls such a remedy.
See note 183 supra.
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2. Sections 116B.09 and 116B.10, an Operational System
The only sections of the Rights Act which contain authority
to directly challenge environmental quality standards and per-
mits issued by various units of government in the state are
Sections 116B.09 and 116B.10.185 The former permits interven-
tion into administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof
which involve "conduct that has caused or is likely to cause
pollution, impairment, or destruction" of the environment. 18 0
The latter authorizes actions for declaratory or equitable relief
against state units of government which have issued environ-
mental quality standards or permits which are allegedly in-
adequate to protect the environment. 1 87  Although these sec-
tions contain several ambiguous provisions, it is suggested that
they can be read in a manner which permits a workable system
to be formulated. In the following material, the more impor-
tant aspects of such a system will be examined.
a. What Agencies are Encompassed?
Section 116B.10(l) specifies that relief can only be obtained
"against the state or any agency or instrumentality thereof."
This limitation to state units of government was a result of a
compromise which proponents of the Rights Act worked out
with the Minnesota Association of Commerce and Industry and
other groups opposed to the Act. 88 In exchange for allowing
compliance with environmental quality rules and decisions of
the four specified agencies to be a complete defense to civil
actions brought under Section 116B.03, it was agreed that the
Act would also contain a method for directly challenging such
rules and decisions. 1 9 However, the scope of Section 116B.10
was not limited to just those four agencies but was extended
to all state units of government. The actual benefit of this
extension is, however, uncertain. The environmental quality
standards and permits issued by the PCA and the Departments
of Natural Resources, Health and Agriculture will probably be
the focus of most actions brought under Section 116B.10 of the
185. Section 116B.08(3) of the Rights Act provides an indirect way
to challenge existing environmental quality standards or permits which
are issued by agencies other than the four specified ones. See text
following note 151 supra.
186. MNN. STAT. § 116B.09 (1) (1971).
187. Id. at § 116B.10(1).
188. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
189. Id.
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Rights Act, but there are other units of government which
issue standards and permits which could be challenged under
this section, including the Livestock Sanitary Board, the State
Planning Board and the Water Resources Board.
Section 116B.09 is much less explicit regarding which units
of government are subject to its provisions. The only provision
which could be interpreted as directly referring to the types of
agencies and other governmental units encompassed by Section
116B.09 is contained in Subdivision 1; it states that intervention
is permitted into "any administrative, licensing, or other similar
proceeding" as well as into actions for judicial review of such
proceedings. While this could be interpreted as referring to the
types of agencies and other governmental units encompassed
by Section 116B.09, a more straightforward reading is that it
relates to the types of actions into which intervention is author-
ized. 190 If the former interpretation is adopted, it is likely to
be held that intervention is authorized into appropriate pro-
ceedings which involve either state, county or local units of
government, since Section 116B.09 allows intervention in "any
administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding." (Em-
phasis added.) However, the result would probably be the
same if the latter interpretation were adopted. Since there is
no provision in Section 116B.09 which restricts it to state agen-
cies and other units of state government, while there is in
Section 116B.10, then, by implication, Section 116B.09 should be
applicable to all three levels of government listed above. It is
therefore suggested that, while Section 116B.09 should encom-
pass governmental units at the state, county and local levels,
the phrase in question should be interpreted as referring to
the types of proceedings into which intervention is permitted.
b. What Types of Proceedings are Encompassed?
Section 116B.10(1) specifies that an action can be main-
tained if it is "a challenge to an environmental quality standard,
limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement
or permit." This exact enumeration also appears in nine
other places in the Act' 9 ' and includes the end product of
190. A third interpretation is that it refers to both. However, it
seems highly unlikely that the legislature intended that the same
phrase be used for these two different purposes.
191. It also appears twice in Sections 116B.02(5), 116B.03(5) and
116B.10 (2), and once in Sections 116B.03 (1), 116B.04 and 116B.10 (3).
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both "contested cases"'10 2 and proceedings for the adoption of
"rules."'193 However, there is some question whether all ac-
tions challenging the adequacy of environmental quality stand-
ards and rules are encompassed by Section 116B.10. The
source of this doubt is Subdivision 1, which states that Section
116B.10 is applicable to actions "for which the applicable statu-
tory appeal period has elapsed." The APA, which controls the
appeal of the PCA regulations and rules concerning air,'94 has no
such appeal period for challenging "rules."'19 Although it could
be held that actions challenging standards and rules for which
there is no statutory appeal period are not within the scope of
Section 116B.10, there are several reasons why the opposite
result should be reached. First, the language itself does not
compel such a result. It could be interpreted as restricting
the operation of Section 116B.10, where there is a statutory
appeal period until after that period has elapsed, but not re-
stricting it at all if there is no such appeal period. Second, the
application of the phrase in question to cases in which there
are statutory appeal periods is remedial in nature; it allows
agency actions to be challenged even after the normal statutory
appeal period has run. It would be inconsistent to apply this
phrase in a restrictive manner to cases which never had an
appeal period in the first place. Third, the enumeration of the
various agency decisions in Subdivision 1 is very inclusive.
Finally, the purpose of this section was to allow direct challeng-
es to standards, rules and permits issued by the four specified
agencies. 190 This purpose would be largely defeated if actions
by those agencies for which there is no statutory appeal period
were excluded.
The only provision which could provide a basis for deter-
mining the types of actions to which Section 116B.09 is applica-
ble is the one providing for intervention into "any administra-
tive, licensing, or other similar proceeding." There are three
ways in which this phrase could be interpreted. It could be
read as including all administrative proceedings, including only
contested cases, or as including only proceedings for the adop-
tion of rules. To the extent that "licensing" is considered a
192. See MwNN. STAT. § 15.0411(4) (1969).
193. Id. at § 15.0411(3).
194. Id. at § 116.07(4).
195. See id. at §§ 15.0413, 15.0416.
196. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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contested case,197 the latter choice of only rule-making proceed-
ings can be eliminated. There are, however, arguments which
support both of the other two choices.
There are two arguments which support the interpretation
that only contested cases are encompassed by the phrase in
question. First, it could be argued that if the intention of the
legislature had been to include all administrative proceedings
there would have been no reason to use "licensing" in addition
to "any administrative" proceeding. In addition, if all such
proceedings were intended to be encompassed by Section
116B.09, it is curious that the inclusive enumeration set forth
in Section 116B.10(1) as well as in nine other places in the
Act' 98 was not employed. However, the better view is that
the phrase in question does include both contested cases and
proceedings for the adoption of rules. The language is at least
open to this interpretation. Since "administrative" is modified
by "any," it should be read to include all administrative pro-
ceedings irrespective of the language following those two words.
In addition, the phrase in question is used in Section 116B.08(1)
in a way that comprehends both types of administrative pro-
ceedings.199 Finally, there are two reasons why it makes little
sense, from a policy standpoint, to restrict the scope of Section
116B.09 to contested cases. First, rule-making proceedings gen-
erally result in decisions which have broader application than
those which result from contested cases. Second, there will be
many situations involving contested cases where, because the
agency is opposing the request of some private party, no inter-
vention may be necessary.
c. When Are These Sections Available?
There appears to be no restriction in Section 116B.09 on what
point in time intervention can be effected into administrative
proceedings, but there is a restriction on intervention into pro-
197. Licensing proceedings at the state, county and local levels are
sometimes difficult to precisely categorize as "contested cases" or as
rule-making proceedings. 2 F. CooPEn, supra note 121, at 483-84. How-
ever, the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that in what might
be considered borderline cases, it will treat the action as a "contested
case." In one recent case, the supreme court stated that an appeal from
an order of the Water Resources Board establishing a new watershed
district "must be classified as a 'contested' case or proceeding ...
Waters v. Putman, 289 Minn. 165, 169, 183 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1971).
198. See note 191 supra.
199. See note 124 supra.
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ceedings for judicial review thereof. Since it is impossible to
intervene into an administrative proceeding which was over at
the time the Rights Act was signed into law, and since Section
116B.09(1) only authorizes intervention into administrative pro-
ceedings or "judicial review thereof," it would appear that in-
tervention under Section 116B.09 is restricted to judicial review
of the results of administrative proceedings which were going
on at the time the Rights Act became law or sometime there-
after. However, because intervenors under this section are ac-
corded the status of a party,20 0 the courts may well uphold
some restrictions by agencies regarding when intervention can
be effected into administrative proceedings. And the courts are
virtually certain to impose some requirement of timeliness for
intervention into judicial review of agency proceedings. 01
The situation in the case of Section 116B.10 is somewhat
different. Subdivision (1) of that section provides that it is
available when "the applicable statutory appeal period has
elapsed." There seem to be three possible interpretations of
this. First, it could be read as restricting the operation of Sec-
tion 116B.10 to those situations where the statutory appeal
period had already elapsed at the time the Rights Act was
signed into law. That reading, however, would largely defeat
the purpose of this section, which is to provide for direct chal-
lenges to rules and decisions issued by the four specified
agencies. 20 2 Second, it could also be interpreted as restricting
Section 116B.10 to those actions which involve challenges to
agency determinations for which there is an "applicable appeal
period." However, for the reasons previously set forth, 203 it
should be read as applying to all agency determinations in the
following manner: (1) if the action has no statutory appeal
period, Section 116B.10 should be available at any time;2 04 and
(2) if there is an appeal period, once it has elapsed, whether it
already has or will do so in the future, Section 116B.10 is
available.
200. MIrNN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1971).
201. MiNN. RuLEs Crv. P., Rule 24.01 states that even where inter-
vention is by right, it must be timely.
202. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
203. See text following note 195 supra.
204. Under this interpretation there may be some difficult issues
involving consolidation of actions. For example, a party could initiate
an action under Section 116B.10 which challenges the adequacy of an
environmental quality standard or permit which some defendant is be-
ing accused of violating in an action brought by a third party under
Section 116B.03.
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d. What is the Scope of Judicial Review?
Section 116B.10(2) provides that the plaintiff has the bur-
den of establishing a prima facie showing2 0 5 that the agency
action being challenged is inadequate to protect the environ-
ment. If this is accomplished, the court must remit the case
to the appropriate agency, which is required to prepare an
order setting forth its position on the case. In addition, the
court is directed to "retain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial
review to determine whether the order of the agency is sup-
ported by the preponderance of the evidence.""  But, the
plaintiff still appears to have the overall burden of persuasion.
With respect to the review of an agency determination,
this is a broader scope of review than that contained in the
APA. The broadest scope of review provided for in the APA
is contained in Section 15.0425(e) and is probably restricted to
contested cases. 20 7 Under that provision, an agency determina-
tion can be reversed or modified if it is "[u]nsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."
This has been interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."2 08
However, from another point of view, the preponderance
of the evidence test is not so incongruous. Actions controlled
205. See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
206. Inqx. STaT. § 116B.10 (3) (1971).
207. The structure of the APA indicates that "rules" are ap-
pealed under Section 15.0416 and that the scope of review for such
appeals is governed by Section 15.0417. "Contested cases," on the
other hand are appealed under Section 15.0424 while the scope of re-
view in those cases is governed by Section 15.0425. However, there is
nothing which absolutely precludes some parts of an action brought un-
der Section 15.0416 from being reviewed according to Section 15.0425.
The language in Section 15.0425 leaves open the possibility that some
findings of fact involved in proceedings for the adoption of "rules"
may fall within the scope of that section.
208. Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal
Warehouse Co., 288 Minn. 294, 299, 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (1970); 4 K.
DAvis, supra note 125, at 118. This language was originally used by
Chief Justice Hughes in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938). The leading case since that decision is Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). It emphasizes that the sub-
stantial evidence test must be on the whole record, not just the evi-
dence which supports the agency determination or finding. Id. at 477.
This is reflected in the Minnesota APA in Section 15.0425(e), which
requires the substantial evidence test to be applied "in view of the
entire record submitted."
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by Section 116B.10 are a combination of a civil action and
judicial review of an agency decision. Subdivision (1) is entitled
"Civil Actions," while Subdivision (3) is entitled, in part,
"Judicial Review," and in Minnesota, the standard of evidence
which must be met by the party bearing the burden of per-
suasion on an issue in a civil action is generally stated as "a fair
preponderance of the evidence. ' 209  This has been defined as
meaning that the evidence of the party bearing the burden of
persuasion must "outweigh, . . .weigh more than ... [or]
overcome" the evidence of the adverse party.2 10  It seems likely
that no distinction will be made between the meaning of the
"preponderance of the evidence" test and the "fair preponderance
of the evidence" test.211
The purpose behind basing review of the agency's order on
whether it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than making the scope of review under the APA gov-
ern, was to provide a more rigorous review of such an order
than would otherwise be available.212  Although the total sig-
nificance of this new scope of review is not clear, its impact
will depend on three factors: (1) whether the standard is
applied to "contested cases" or proceedings for the adoption of
"rules;" (2) whether or not the reviewing court is restricted to
the record submitted by the agency; and (3) the general attitude
of the Minnesota courts towards environmental problems.
The scope of review set up by the "preponderance of the
evidence" test will have a greater impact on actions brought to
challenge the results of agency proceedings for the adoption of
rules than on those challenging determinations reached in con-
tested cases. The reason for this differential impact is that
under the APA the scope of review for the former type of
209. Wick v. Widdell, 276 Minn. 51, 53-54, 149 N.W.2d 20, 22
(1967); Trimbo v. Minnesota Valley Natural Gas Co., 260 Minn. 386,
398, 110 N.W.2d 168, 176 (1961); Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424,
427-29, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960); Village of Plummer v. Anchor
Casualty Co., 240 Minn. 355, 356-57, 61 N.W.2d 225, 226 (1953).
210. Aubin v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 348, 211 N.W.
580, 583 (1926).
211. But cf. Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Trust Estate, 155
Minn. 199, 202, 193 N.W. 122, 123-24 (1923); Lindsley v. Chicago,
M. & St. P.R. Co., 36 Minn. 539, 543, 33 N.W. 7, 9 (1887). Early cases
such as these, where the announced standard was the "preponderance
of the evidence," suggest that the current "fair preponderance of the
evidence" test may be somewhat different. However, it is not readily
apparent what this difference may be.
212. Interview with Rep. Rolf Nelson, member of the House Judiciary
Committee, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Aug. 23, 1971.
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action 21 3 is narrower than it is for the latter type.21 4 Although
the sections which control the scope of review under the APA
are similar in some ways, the section governing "contested
cases" permits the reviewing court to reverse or modify the
agency determination if it is "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence"21 5 or "arbitrary or capricious."2 1 0
The provision in Section 116B.10 of the Rights Act for a
different scope of judicial review than is contained in the APA
is divergent from the trend in Minnesota towards providing a
uniform scope of judicial review for appeals from agency de-
cisions. This trend is especially clear in the area of contested
cases. In the past, the scope of judicial review of an agency
decision in a contested case depended, in part, upon the pro-
vision for judicial review, if any, contained in the statute which
governed a particular agency.21 7 However, the recent decision
in Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal
Warehouse Co. 213 has apparently ended any distinction in the
scope of judicial review based upon the statute under which
review was obtained. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether the scope of
judicial review in a contested case arising from a decision of
the Public Service Commission was controlled by the statute
governing that agency2 1 9 or by Section 15.0425 of the APA.
The court held that the APA controlled, stating that "the
enactment of Section 15.0425 of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1963 . . .was unmistakably intended by the legislature
to make uniform the scope of judicial review of the decisions of
all administrative fact-finding agencies .... "220 This was re-
affirmed soon after in another case involving the same
agency.2 21
213. See note 178 supra.
214. See note 180 supra.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Compare Gibson v. Civil Service Board, 285 Minn- 123, 171
N.W.2d 712 (1969), with Dahlen Transport, Inc. v. Hahne, 261 Minn.
218, 112 N.W.2d 630 (1961).
218. 288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970).
219. The method of bringing appeals from decisions of the Public
Service Commission is controlled by MIni'. STT. § 216.24 (1969). The
scope of review for such appeals had previously been controlled by
Section 216.25.
220. 288 Minn. at 297-98, 180 N.W.2d at 177.
221. Quinn Distributing Co. v. Quast Transfer, Inc., 288 Minn. 442,
181 N.W.2d 696 (1970).
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It seems clear from these recent decisions that the scope of
judicial review in Minnesota of appeals from agency determi-
nations in contested cases will, as a general rule, be controlled by
Section 15.0425 of the APA. However, there are six reasons
why this should not affect the scope of review set forth in
Section 116B.10(3) of the Rights Act. First, the intent of the
legislature in Subdivision (3) is clear; the standard is the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test. Second, the legislative history
of that section shows that the APA was not to govern its
operation. 222  Third, the Rights Act was enacted subsequent
to the APA-and to the decision in Minneapolis Van-while
the statute in Minneapolis Van was enacted prior to the APA.
Fourth, the recent decisions providing for a uniform scope of
review involved appeals from agency decisions; actions brought
under Section 116B.10 are a combination of a civil action and
judicial review of an agency order. Fifth, the purpose behind
basing review of the agency's order on whether it is supported by
a preponderance of the evidence was to provide a more rigorous
review of such orders than would otherwise be available.22 3
Finally, from a policy standpoint, there is some justifica-
tion in having more rigorous review in Section 116B.10 pro-
ceedings than is normally the case because the agency is being
forced to reconsider its own decision. In other cases, an agency
is making an original determination and will probably be less
committed to a certain predetermined position.
With respect to the scope of judicial review of appeals from
rule-making proceedings, the law in Minnesota is less clear. The
recent decisions in Minneapolis Van and its sequel, Quinn Dis-
tributing,224 both involved contested cases not rule-making pro-
ceedings. However, even if the rationale in those cases is
extended to rule-making proceedings, 226 the scope of review in
the Rights Act should not be affected. If an action is brought
under Section 116B.10 to challenge a rule or regulation, the
standard set forth in Subdivision (3) should control the scope of
review for the very same reasons it should do so in contested
cases.
The degree to which the scope of review contained in Sec-
tion 116B.10 will, in practice, differ from that provided by the
APA also depends on whether a court, in reviewing the order
222. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
223. See note 212 supra.
224. 288 Minn. 442, 181 N.W.2d 696 (1970).
225. See note 207 supra.
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of an agency made pursuant to Subdivision (3) of that section,
is restricted to the record made during the agency proceeding.
In actions controlled by the APA such review would generally
be confined to the record as submitted by the agency.2 -0  But,
as previously discussed, the APA does not control Section
116B.10 of the Rights Act.22 7  However, in spite of that, there
are two reasons why the court should be so restricted under
Section 116B.10. First, this was the law in Minnesota even
before the adoption of the APA, 228 and second, the Rights
Act can be read to imply such a result. In Section 116B.08(2),
the Act states that following the agency proceeding provided
for in Subdivision (1), "the court shall adjudicate the impact of
the defendants' conduct" on the environment and "may order
that additional evidence be taken to the extent necessary to
protect the rights recognized in this act." There is no such pro-
vision in Section 116B.10 which can be interpreted to mean that
the court is permitted to take additional evidence in reviewing
the agency's order.
On the other hand, there are also reasons which support
greater flexibility in this area. First, the APA itself is not
totally rigid in its application where a court is hearing addi-
tional evidence when reviewing an agency decision.22 0  Second,
since an agency is being forced to reconsider its own decision,
it may not always provide as full a hearing as might be desira-
ble. A court could, however, always remand to solve this
problem.
Finally, the attitude of the supreme court towards differen-
tiating between various standards of evidence in the area of
judicial review of agency decisions will also be a factor in deter-
mining the ultimate effect of the scope of review provided for
226. MNN. STAT. § 15.0424(6) (1969).
227. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
228. E.g., Minnesota State Federation of Labor v. Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc., 248 Minn. 230, 238-39, 79 N.W.2d 366, 371 (1956); Ny-
berg v. R.N. Cardozo & Bros., Inc., 243 Minn. 361, 364, 67 N.W.2d 821,
823 (1954); Hamlin v. The Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 449-50, 35
N.W.2d 616, 622 (1949).
229. The APA provides that, in "contested cases,"
[tlhe review shall be conducted by the court without a jury
and shall be confined to the record, except that in cases of
alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not zhown
in the record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court.
The court shall, upon request, hear oral argument and receive
written briefs ....
MmNx. STAT. § 15.0424(6) (1969).
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in Section 116B.10. In the past, the court has generally avoided
technical complexities and, irrespective of the verbal formula-
tion, ended up with a "substantial evidence" test.23 0 In view of
this, it is unlikely that the Minnesota Supreme Court will pur-
port to quantify, but rather will merely rank in order the
"preponderance of the evidence" and the "substantial evidence"
tests. The standard in Section 116B.10 will then serve as a
directional signal which, in close cases, may provide for a differ-
ent outcome than the "substantial evidence" test would.
In contrast to Section 116B.10 there is no explicit statement
in Section 116B.09 concerning the scope of review. It does,
however, provide that
[in any action for judicial review of any administrative, li-
censing, or other similar proceeding as described in subdivision
1 above, the court shall, in addition to any other duties imposed
upon it by law, grant review of claims that the conduct caused,
or is likely to cause pollution ... of . . . natural resources lo-
cated within the state, and in granting such review it shall act
in accordance with the provisions of this act and the adminis-
trative procedures [sic] act.231
Although this provision is likely to be read as requiring that
the APA govern the scope of judicial review in all cases
controlled by Section 116B.09, an argument can be made that,
in cases involving state agencies, Section 116B.10 should control
the scope of review.23
2
230. The scope of review, in most cases, is determined, or at least
influenced, by the statute under which it was obtained. The scope of
review in cases brought under different statutes is remarkably similar,
partly because of the similarity of the statutes and partly because of
the common sense approach the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken
to the question. The usual scope of review was stated in Bryan v.
Community State Bank, 285 Minn. 226, 234, 172 N.W.2d 771, 776 (1969),
where the court ruled that
[a] court will not interfere with an administrative agency's
conclusions unless it appears that the agency has violated a
constitutional provision; has not kept within its jurisdiction;
has proceeded on an erroneous theory of law, has acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously so that its determination represents its
will and not its judgment; or is without evidence to support
its conclusions.
This test is viewed by the court as the same as the scope of review
provided under the "contested case" provisions of the APA. Minne-
apolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co.,
288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970). For a lengthy compilation of
the cases dealing with the scope of review, see DuN. DiG. (revised 3d
ed.) § 397b (1967).
231. MINN. STAT. § 116B.09 (3) (1971) (Emphasis added.)
232. There are also two other interpretations, both of which are
considerably more expansive than the previously mentioned ones.
First, it could be read as providing two scopes of judicial review;
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This latter interpretation depends heavily on the initial
phrase in Subdivision (1) of Section 116B.09, which states 'Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in section 10 of this act ...." This
implies that if there are any conflicts between Sections 116B.09
and 116B.10 the latter should control. The immediate question
which arises, of course, is whether this phrase applies to all of
Section 116B.09 or only to Subdivision (1). If it is restricted to
only that one subdivision, the phrase in question would be
largely superfluous since there is no conflict between Subdi-
vision (1) of Section 116B.09 and the provisions in Section
116B.10. Assuming, then, that it does apply to the whole section,
it could be argued that any conflict between the scope of review
in these two sections should be resolved in favor of Section
116B.10. This can be reconciled with the language in Section
116B.09(3) (set out above) in the following way. Since Section
116B.09 itself says nothing about the procedure for judicial
review, the APA would govern. But where the decisions of
a state agency are involved, the scope of review in Section
116B.09 proceedings would conflict with the scope of review set
forth in Section 116B.10. In such cases, Section 116B.10 would
control the scope of judicial review.
But, in spite of the ambiguous language in Subdivisions (1)
and (3) of Section 116B.09, the better interpretation is that the
scope of review is controlled by the APA in all cases where
intervention into administrative proceedings or judicial review
thereof is effected by use of Section 116B.09. There is no spe-
cific provision in that section governing the scope of review
while there is in Section 116B.10; by implication, there was no
legislative intent to provide one in Section 116B.09. In addition,
the legislative history shows that at one time Section 116B.10
contained references to the APA.2 3  Such references were de-
leted from that section but not from Section 116B.09. Moreover,
the interpretation by the Minnesota Supreme Court of the leg-
islative intent behind Section 15.0425 of the APA2 34 suggests
that where there is room for debate, it will rule in favor of a
uniform scope of judicial review under the APA.
"polluters" would be goverened by the APA standards, while "en-
vironmentalists" would be governed by the more favorable standard in
Section 116B.10. Second, it could be contended that the scope of re-
view for all parties in cases controlled by Section 116B.09 is governed
by Section 116B.10.
233. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
234. See text accompanying notes 218-24 supra
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3. Use of Sections 116B.09 and 116B.10 by Corporation X
In the instant hypothetical situation, Corporation X could
get judicial review under the APA but would be unable to
make effective use of either Section 11613.09 or Section 116B.10.
However, as is discussed in the following material, there are
cases in which a similarly situated party could profitably utilize
both of these sections.
a. Section 116B.09
In the instant hypothetical case, there are two reasons why
Corporation X would be unable to make effective use of Section
116B.09. First, this section authorizes intervention into certain
administrative proceedings and into judicial review thereof. In
this case, the administrative proceedings are over and there is
as yet no judicial review into which one could intervene. Sec-
ond, intervention is only authorized
upon the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceed-
ing or action for judicial review involves conduct that has
caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion of the air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state.235
It is doubtful that Corporation X would want to file a verified
pleading asserting that the conduct involved, the discharge of
sulfur into the air, would cause pollution.230
Section 116B.09 could, however, be utilized in some cases
by a party which some persons would label a polluter. The
general situation in which this would occur is where the con-
duct at issue, in and of itself, is regarded by some persons as
beneficial to the environment while others consider it detrimen-
tal. For example, there is divided opinion over selective cutting
in parklands in Minnesota. Some conservationists believe that
these areas should be allowed to exist without such artificial
forestry cultivation methods. Other persons believe that, since
selective cutting improves the quality of a forest by permitting
new growth, it should be carried on even in parklands.237  In
235. MiNN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1971).
236. However, it could be argued that the agency's conduct may
cause pollution and that such conduct can be the subject of the verified
pleading. For example, it could be argued that the process of reducing
the sulfur content of discharges into the air might result in other
pollutants being emitted.
237. This type of dispute is currently going on over selective cut-
ting in the federally-owned Boundary Waters Canoe Area in northern
Minnesota.
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this type of situation, if an agency decided not to grant any
permits for logging using selective cutting methods, a company
in the logging business which had not originally applied for
such a permit could intervene into judicial review of that de-
cision under Section 116B.09.
b. Section 116B.10
Subdivision (1) of this section permits an action to be
maintained "where the nature of the action is a challenge to an
environmental quality standard," etc. This, by itself, could be
interpreted as permitting Corporation X to challenge the new
standard on sulfur content of discharges into the air. However,
Subdivision (2) provides:
In any action maintained under this section the plaintiff shall
have the burden of proving that the environmental quality
standard... is inadequate to protect the air ... within the
state from pollution ....
And Subdivision (3) states that the action shall be dismissed if
the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie showing on the
above matter.238  In the instant hypothetical, Corporation X
may be able to establish such a showing. But, for obvious
reasons, the chances of it actually doing so are very remote.
There is at least one general situation in which an indus-
trial concern like Corporation X could profitably use this section
to actually challenge an agency ruling or decision.23 9 The situ-
ation could arise where an agency of the state promulgates
a new standard or issues a permit relating to environmental
quality towards which some industrial company is favorable.
At the same time, that company may believe that other persons
in the state will challenge the standard or permit as being in-
adequate to protect the environment. Before the company
invests in plant and equipment, it might well decide that some
assurance is needed that the standard or permit will not be
changed in the near future. It could challenge the standard
under Section 116B.10 and proceed to deliberately lose the case.
There is nothing in Section 116B.10 to prevent such an action,
since "any partnership, corporation, [or] association . . . having
shareholders, members, partners or employees residing within
238. The use of "prima facie showing" is discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 100-102 supra.
239. In addition, such a party could intervene under Section
116B.10, Subdivision (4) in actions brought to challenge the adequacy
of environmental quality standards or permits.
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the state" can maintain an action under this section.240  This
would, however, conflict with one of the central purposes of the
standing doctrine, which is to ensure there is, in fact, an actual
dispute or controversy between the parties. There is no real
dispute in this case since the company likes the new standard. 24 ,
There are two solutions to this. It could be held that the
purpose of Section 116B.10 was not to provide procedures for
upholding a standard or permit relating to environmental qual-
ity, but rather to strike down or modify those which do not
adequately protect the environment. Standing could, theoreti-
cally, be denied based on this argument. In any event, if there
is some notice of an action like the one in question, other
persons could intervene under the authority of Subdivision (4)
and utilize Section 116B.10 to strike down the standard or de-
cision just as if they had initiated the action.
4. Use of Sections 116B.09 and 116B.10 by the Conservation
Group
a. Section 116B.09
In the instant hypothetical, the administrative proceeding
already having been completed, there would be no way to inter-
vene into an administrative proceeding. At an earlier point in
time the conservation group could have done so upon filing the
required verified pleading.24 2 In such a case, Section 116B.09(2)
would be of critical importance. That provision provides:
In any such administrative, licensing, or other similar proceed-
ings, the agency shall consider the alleged impairment . . . of
. .. natural resources . .. and no conduct shall be authorized
or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long
as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with
the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and
welfare and the state's paramount concern for the protection of
its . . . natural resources from pollution, impairment, or de-
struction. Economic considerations alone shall not justify such
conduct.
240. MINN. STAT. § 116B.10(1) (1971).
241. Cases could, however, arise where an industrial company may
legitimately want to challenge the adequacy of a new standard. For
instance, it may have already installed pollution control equipment
which permits it to meet a stricter standard. Competitors would be
in a possibly advantageous position if a weaker standard were adopted.
They not only could avoid the cost of additional pollution control
equipment, but also the higher operating costs that many times result
from the use of such equipment.
242. MINN. STAT. § 116B.09(1) (1971).
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This provision is very similar to the affirmative defense in
the second paragraph of Section 116B.04.243 There is, however,
one important difference. Under Section 116B.09, an agency
could legitimately authorize conduct which is not "consistent
with the reasonable requirements of public health," etc., as long
as it was established that there was no "feasible and prudent
alternative." In contrast, if a defendant in a civil action main-
tained under the authority of Section 116B.03 wants to utilize
the affirmative defense in Section 116B.04, it must be established
that there is no "feasible and prudent alternative" and that the
conduct at issue is "reasonably required for the promotion of
the public health," etc. In Section 116B.09, only one of the
factors need be established before an agency can authorize the
conduct at issue to continue, while both factors must be estab-
lished in a Section 116B.03 action in order to excuse conduct
which is causing pollution. While this difference was not in-
tentional,244 there is some logic in it. In actions under Section
116B.03, if the defendant establishes both the factors set out
above, a complete defense is established and the conduct can
continue. In actions governed by Section 116B.09, only one
factor has to be established but the agency then has the discre-
tion to authorize it; there is no requirement that it do so.
An agency could require both of the factors to be established
before it would authorize the conduct at issue. This does, how-
ever, give agencies considerably more discretion than Section
116B.09 was probably intended to give them.
b. Section 116B.1O
Assuming this section is applicable to cases in which there
is no statutory appeal period,2 45 the conservation group must
first establish a prima facie showing2 40 that the rule in question
is not adequate to protect the environment.2 47 If this is not
satisfied, the court must dismiss.24 If it is satisfied, the court
must "remit the parties to the state agency or instrumentality
that promulgated" the rule249-here the PCA. The agency
243. See Part HI B2 (c) supra.
244. Interview with Richard N. Flint, chairman of the Environ-
mental Law Subcommittee of the Minnesota Bar Association, in Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 9, 1971.
245. See text accompanying notes 191-96 supra.
246. MrNN. STAT. § 116B.10(2), (3) (1971).
247. Id.
248. Id. at (3).
249. Id.
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is then required to "institute the appropriate administrative pro-
ceedings to consider and make findings and an order" regarding
those matters upon which the plaintiff's prima facie case is
based.250 It is also specified that the court retains jurisdiction
of the case "for purposes of judicial review to determine whether
the order of the agency is supported by the preponderance of
the evidence."'25 1
Subdivision (3) permits the court to grant temporary relief
to prevent irreparable injury if the case is remitted,2 5 2 but
there is no provision for the posting of security. This is con-
trary to Section 116B.07, which generally controls relief in civil
actions maintained under Section 116B.03, but is identical with
the provision in Section 116B.08(l), which controls remittance
in such actions. It could be argued from this that no security
is required before one can obtain temporary relief in actions
controlled by Section 116B.10. Some additional support for this
contention is that Section 116B.10(3) provides for the assess-
ment of "such costs and disbursements as the court deems ap-
propriate" if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie showing
in actions brought under the authority of Section 116B.10. It
could be argued that the court was to have discretion in assess-
ing costs in the area of security for damages incurred because of
the imposition of a temporary injunction. However, the above
provision was probably intended to be a guard against harass-
ment of state agencies. In any event, Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.03 requires that some security be posted, leaving
only the amount to the court's discretion. Therefore, as was
the case under Section 116B.08(1), 25 3 some security will have to
be posted in order to obtain a temporary injunction.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past, only legislative or administrative action had
the potential to effectively protect the environment. Recent
years, however, have seen the rise of increased sentiment that
this potential has not been fulfilled. Legislation such as the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act is a major response to
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. There is no indication of what the permissible subject of this
temporary relief may be. However, it appears that in a case brought
to challenge the adequacy of permits issued by a state agency, the
court could temporarily enjoin the use of such permits.
253. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
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this problem. It provides a third alternative for protection of
the environment. By giving courts more power to deal with
environmental matters, it not only allows citizen initiative to
play a part in preservation of our natural resources but may
also serve as a catalyst for increased administrative response to
such problems.
However, this type of legislation is based on the premise
that the courts will be more receptive to increased protection
of natural resources than are administrative agencies set up to
pursue that goal. To the extent this is an accurate evaluation,
the Act will provide for increased protection of the environment.
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APPENDIX
An act relating to environmental protection; providing a civil
action for protection of the environment from pollution, im-
pairment or destruction; providing permanent and temporary
relief and remedies.
Section 1. [116B.01] PURPOSE. The legislature finds and de-
clares that each person is entitled by right to the protection, preserva-
tion, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other natural resources
located within the state and that each person has the responsibility to
contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhancement thereof.
The legislature further declares its policy to create and maintain
within the state conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony in order that present and future generations may
enjoy clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources
with which this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public
interest to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land
and other natural resources located within the state from pollution, im-
pairment, or destruction.
Sec. 2. [116B.02] DEFINITIONS. Subdivision 1. For purposes of
this act, the following terms have the meanings given them in this
section.
Subd. 2. "Person" means any natural person, any state, munici-
pality or other governmental or political subdivision or other public
agency or instrumentality, any public or private corporation, any part-
nership, firm, association, or other organization, any receiver, trustee,
assignee, agent, or other legal representative of any of the foregoing,
and any other entity, except a family farm, a family farm corporation
or a bona fide farmer corporation.
Subd. 3. "Nonresident individual" means any natural person, or
his personal representative, who is not domiciled or residing in the
state when suit is commenced.
Subd. 4. Natural resources shall include, but not be limited to, all
mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, rec-
reational and historical resources. Scenic and esthetic resources shall
also be considered natural resources when owned by any govern-
mental unit or agency.
Subd. 5. "Pollution, impairment or destruction" is any conduct
by any person which violates, or is likely to violate, any environ-
mental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license,
stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality,
agency, or political subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the
date the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct
which materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely
affect the environment; provided that "pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion" shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate,
any such standard, limitation, regulation, rules, order, license, stipula-
tion agreement or permit solely because of the introduction of an odor
into the air.
Subd. 6. "Family farm" shall mean any farm owned by a natural
person, or one or more natural persons all of whom are related within
the third degree of kindred according to the civil law, at least one of
whose owners resides on or actively operates said farm.
Subd. 7. "Family farm corporation" means a corporation founded
for the purpose of farming and owning agricultural land, in which the
majority of the voting stock is held by, and the majority of the stock-
holders are, members of a family related to each other within the third
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degree of kindred according to the rules of the civil lav, and at least
one of whose stockholders is a person residing on or actively operating
the farm, and none of whose stockholders are corporations.
Subd. 8. '"Bona fide farmer corporation" means an association of
two or more natural persons, one of which, if two persons are so
associated, or the majority of which, if more than two persons are so
associated, reside on, or are actively operating a farm.
Sec. 3. [116B.03] CIVIL ACTIONS. Subdivision 1. Any person
residing within the state; the attorney general; any political subdivision
of the state; any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political
subdivision thereof; or any partnership, corporation, association, or-
ganization, or other entity having shareholders, members, partners
or employees residing within the state may maintain a civil action in
the district court for declaratory or equitable relief in the name of the
state of Minnesota against any person, for the protection of the air,
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether
publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion; provided, however, that no action shall be allowable hereunder
for acts taken by a person on land leased or owned by said person
pursuant to a permit or license issued by the owner of the land to
said person which do not and cannot reasonably be expected to pollute,
impair, or destroy any other air, water, land, or other natural resources
located within the state; provided further that no action shall be allow-
able under this section for conduct taken by a person pursuant to any
environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, li-
cense, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the pollution control
agency, department of natural resources, department of health or de-
partment of agriculture.
Subd. 2. Within seven days after commencing such action, the
plaintiff shall cause a copy of the summons and complaint to be served
upon the attorney general and the pollution control agency. Within
21 days after commencing such action, the plaintiff shall cause written
notice thereof to be published in a legal newspaper in the county in
which suit is commenced, specifying the names of the parties, the des-
ignation of the court in which the suit was commenced, the date of
filing, the act or acts complained of, and the declaratory or equitable
relief requested. The court may order such additional notice to inter-
ested persons as it may deem just and equitable.
Subd. 3. In any action maintained under this section, the at-
torney general may intervene as a matter of right and may appoint
outside counsel where as a result of such intervention he may repre-
sent conflicting or adverse interests. Other interested parties may be
permitted to intervene on such terms as the court may deem just and
equitable in order to effectuate the purposes and policies set forth in
section 1.
Subd. 4. Except as provided in Minnesota Statutes, Sections
15.0416, 15.0424, 115.05, 116.07 and 542.03, any action maintained under
this section may be brought in any county in which one or more of
the defendants reside when the action is begun, or in which the cause
of action or some part thereof arose, or in which the conduct which
has or is likely to cause such pollution, impairment, or destruction
occurred. If none of the defendants shall reside or be found in the
state, the action may be begun and tried in any county which the
plaintiff shall designate. A corporation, other than railroad companies,
street railway companies, and street railroad companies whether the
motive power is steam, electricity, or other power used by these cor-
porations or companies, also telephone companies, telegraph companies,
and all other public service corporations, shall be considered as re-
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siding in any county wherein it has an office, resident agency or,
business place. The above enumerated public service corporations shall
be considered as residing in any county wherein the cause of action
shall arise or in which the conduct which has or is likely to cause
pollution, impairment or destruction occurred and wherein any part of
its lines of railway, railroad, street railway, street railroad, without
regard to the motive power of the railroad, street railway, or street
railroad, telegraph or telephone lines or any other public service cor-
poration shall extend, without regard to whether the corporation or
company has an office, agent, or business place in the county or not.
Subd. 5. Where any action maintained under this section results
in a judgment that a defendant has not violated an environmental
quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation
agreement, or permit promulgated or issued by the pollution control
agency, department of natural resources, department of health, or de-
partment of agriculture, the judgment shall not in any way estop the
agency from relitigating any or all of the same issues with the same
or other defendant unless in the prior action the agency was, either
initially or by intervention a party. Where the action results in a
judgment that the defendant has violated an environmental quality
standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agree-
ment, or permit promulgated or issued by the pollution control agency,
department of natural resources, department of health or department
of agriculture the judgment shall be res judicata in favor of the agency
in any action the agency might bring against the same defendant.
Sec. 4. [116B.04] BURDEN OF PROOF. In any action maintained
under section 3, where the subject of the action is conduct governed
by any environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, or-
der, license, stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued
by the pollution control agency, department of natural resources,
department of health, or department of agriculture, whenever the plain-
tiff shall have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the
defendant violates or is likely to violate said environmental quality
standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agree-
ment, or permit, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by
the submission of evidence to the contrary; provided, however, that
where the environmental quality standards, limitations, regulations,
rules, orders, licenses, stipulation agreements, or permits of two or
more of the aforementioned agencies are inconsistent, the most stringent
shall control.
In any other action maintained under section 3, whenever the
plaintiff shall have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the
defendant has, or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or de-
struction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by
the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also
show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and
prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is consistent with and rea-
sonably required for promotion of the public health, safety, and wel-
fare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its
air, water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment,
or destruction. Economic considerations alone shall not constitute a
defense hereunder.
Sec. 5. [116B.05] APPOINTMENT OF REFEREE. The court may
appoint a referee, who shall be a disinterested person to take testimony
and make a report to the court in any such action.
Sec. 6. [116B.06] BOND. If the court has reasonable grounds
to doubt the plaintiffs ability to pay any judgment for costs and dis-
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bursements which might be rendered against him pursuant to Minne-
sota Statutes, Chapter 549, in an action brought under section 3, the
court may order the plaintiff to post a bond or cash not to exceed
$500 to serve as security for such judgment.
Sec. 7. [116B.07] RELIEF. The court may grant declaratory re-
lief, temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such
conditions upon a party as are necessary or appropriate to protect the
air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment, or destruction. When the court grants tem-
porary equitable relief, it may require the plaintiff to post a bond suf-
ficient to indemnify the defendant for damages suffered because of the
temporary relief, if permanent relief is not granted.
Sec. 8. [116B.08] REMITTITUR. Subdivision 1. If administrative
licensing, or other similar proceedings are required to determine the
legality of the defendants' conduct, the court shall remit the parties to
such proceedings. If administrative, licensing, or other similar proceed-
ings are available to determine the legality of the defendants' conduct,
the court may remit the parties to such proceedings. In so remitting
the parties the court may grant temporary equitable relief where ap-
propriate to prevent irreparable injury to the air, water, land or other
natural resources located within the state. In so remitting the parties
the court shall retain jurisdiction of the cause pending completion
thereof.
Subd. 2. Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall
adjudicate the impact of the defendants' conduct, program, or product
on the air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the
state in accordance with the preceding sections 2 through 7. In such
adjudication, the court may order that additional evidence be taken
to the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act.
Subd. 3. Where, as to any such administrative, licensing, or other
similar proceedings referred to above, judicial review thereof is avail-
able, notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the
court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain jurisdiction for
purposes of judicial review.
Subd. 4. Nothing in this section shall be applicable to any action
maintained under section 10 of this act or to any appropriate admin-
istrative proceeding required thereunder.
Sec. 9. [116B.09] INTERVENTION; JUDICIAL REVIEW. Sub-
division 1. Except as otherwise provided in section 10 of this act, in
any administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding, and in any
action for judicial review thereof which is made available by law, any
natural person residing within the state, the attorney general, any
political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of
the state or of a political subdivision thereof, or any partnership,
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity having share-
holders, members, partners, or employees residing within the state
shall be permitted to intervene as a party upon the filing of a verified
pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review
involves conduct that has caused or is likely to cause pollution, im-
pairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural re-
sources located within the state.
Subd. 2. In any such administrative, licensing, or other similar
proceedings, the agency shall consider the alleged impairment, pollu-
tion, or destruction of the air, water, land, or other natural resources
located within the state and no conduct shall be authorized or approved
which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as there is a feasible
and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of
the public health, safety, and welfare and the state's paramount con-
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cern for the protection of its air, water, land, and other natural re-
sources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. Economic con-
siderations alone shall not justify such conduct.
Subd. 3. In any action for judicial review of any administrative,
licensing, or other similar proceeding as described in subdivision 1
above, the court shall, in addition to any other duties imposed upon it
by law, grant review of claims that the conduct caused, or is likely to
cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land, or
other natural resources located within the state, and in granting such
review it shall act in accordance with the provisions of this act and
the administrative procedures act.
Sec. 10. [116B.10] REVIEWAL OF STATE ACTIONS. Subdivi-
sion 1. CIVIL ACTIONS. As hereinafter provided in this section, any
natural person residing within the state; the attorney general; any
political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or agency of
the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership, cor-
poration, association, organization, or other legal entity having share-
holders, members, partners or employees residing within the state may
maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory or equitable
relief against the state or any agency or instrumentality thereof where
the nature of the action is a challenge to an environmental quality
standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipulation agree-
ment, or permit promulgated or issued by the state or any agency or
instrumentality thereof for which the applicable statutory appeal pe-
riod has elapsed.
Subd. 2. BURDEN OF PROOF. In any action maintained un-
der this section the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the
environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, li-
cense, stipulation agreement, or permit is inadequate to protect the air,
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment, or destruction. The plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving the existence of material evidence showing said
inadequacy of said environmental quality standard, limitation, regu-
lation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit.
Subd. 3. REMITTITUR; JUDICIAL REVIEW. In any action main-
tained under this section the district court, upon a prima facie show-
ing by the plaintiff of those matters specified in subdivision 2, shall
remit the parties to the state agency or instrumentality that promul-
gated the environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule,
order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit which is the subject of
the action, requiring said agency or instrumentality to institute the ap-
propriate administrative proceedings to consider and make findings
and an order on those matters specified in subdivision 2. In so remitting
the parties, the court may grant temporary equitable relief where
appropriate to prevent irreparable injury to the air, water, land, or
other natural resources located within the state. In so remitting the
parties, the court shall retain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial
review to determine whether the order of the agency is supported by
the preponderance of the evidence. If plaintiff fails to establish said
prima facie showing, the court shall dismiss the action and award such
costs and disbursements as the court deems appropriate.
Subd. 4. INTERVENTION. In any action maintained under this
section, any natural person residing within the state; the attorney gen-
eral; any political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or agency
of the state of a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership, cor-
poration, association, organization or other legal entity having share-
holders, members, partners or employees residing within the state shall be
permitted to intervene as a party, provided that said person makes timely
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application to the district court prior to the court's remittance of the
action as specified in subdivision 3.
Subd. 5. VENUE. Any action maintained under this section shall
be brought in the county in which is located the principal office of
the state agency or instrumentality that promulgated the rule, regula-
tion, standard, order or permit which is the subject of the action.
Sec. 11. [116B.11] JURISDICTION; SERVING PROCESS. Subdi-
vision 1. As to any cause of action arising under sections 1 to 14 hereof,
the district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign
corporation or any nonresident individual, or his personal representa-
tive, in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or he
were a resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or
through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident individual:
(a) Commits or threatens to commit any act in the state
which would impair, pollute or destroy the air, water, land,
or other natural resources located within the state, or
(b) Commits or threatens to commit any act outside the
state which would impair, pollute or destroy the air, water,
land or other natural resources located within the state, or
(c) Engages in any other of the activities specified in
section 543.19 of the Minnesota statutes.
Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section,
may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defend-
ant outside this state with the same effect as though the summons had
been personally served within this state.
Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated or
referenced in subdivision 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an
action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the
right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter pro-
vided by law or the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 12. [116B.12] RIGHTS AND REMEDIES NONEXCLUSIVE.
No existing civil or criminal remedy for any wrongful action shall be
excluded or impaired by this act. The rights and remedies provided
herein shall be in addition to any administrative, regulatory, statutory
or common law rights and remedies now or hereafter available.
Sec. 13. [116B.13] SEVERABILITY. If any section, subdivision,
sentence, or clause of this act shall be adjudged unconstitutional, such
adjudication shall not affect the validity of the act as a whole or of
any section, subdivision, sentence, or clause thereof not adjudged uncon-
stitutionaL
Sec. 14. [116B.14] CITATION. This act may be cited as the 'Win-
nesota Environmental Rights Act".
Approved June 7, 1971.
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